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1. Introduction  
The losses caused by the on-going financial crisis now exceed $4 trillion.1 This is in 
addition to the associated social and economic costs that are more difficult to 
measure.2 From a litigator’s perspective it is not surprising that these massive losses 
have triggered a very large number of civil claims. In the immediate aftermath of the 
crisis these claims were mostly run-of-the-mill misrepresentation actions by 
investors against their investment advisors, but there is now a clear, global trend 
where plaintiffs are casting their nets more widely and going after the financial 
actors allegedly responsible for the crisis itself.3 One class of defendants who fit 
squarely in this category are credit rating agencies.4 These financial actors are facing 
a global push by lawmakers to regulate their operations with, inter alia, the express 
aim of setting parameters for the liability ratings agencies should incur in the 
publication of ratings.  
Just as legislatures are attempting to respond to the crisis with new statutes, 
so too is judge-made law in common law jurisdictions developing in leaps and 
bounds. The recent landmark decision from the Federal Court of Australia, Bathurst 
Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services,5 held for the first time 
that a ratings agency owes a duty of care to potential investors, breach whereof 
rendered the rating agency in question liable for all of the losses incurred by the 
disappointed investors. These developments—whether they originate in a courtroom 
or at the headquarters of International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) in Madrid, Spain—will be of great interest to all market participants 
involved in the sale and structuring of complex credit products.6 In particular, 
                                                
1 Internatioal Monetary Fund ‘Crisis and Recovery’ World Economic Outlook, April 2009, available 
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/exesum.pdf, accessed on 18 August 2013. 
2 For instance, South Africa is said to have lost 1 000 000 jobs as a direct consequence of the financial 
crisis. See e.g. Claire Bisseker ‘Unemployment rises for under 25 year olds’ Financial Mail, 1 August 
2013, available at http://www.fm.co.za/business/fox/2013/08/01/unemployment-rises-for-under-25-
year-olds, accessed on 13 August 2013. 
3 Ernst Karner ‘Tort Law and the Financial Crisis: Basic Questions’ (2013) 4(2) Journal of European 
Tort Law 119. 
4 Jonathan Swanepoel, ‘Credit rating agencies – soon to face wide-ranging liability?’, 30 November 
2012, available at http://www.webberwentzel.com/wwb/content/en/ww/ww-most-
popular?oid=44154&sn=Detail-2011&pid=32711, accessed on 17 July 2013. 
5 [2012] FCA 1200. 
6  Lisa McKenna, ‘An uncertain forecast for credit rating agencies: liability for negligent 
misrepresentation after Bathurst’ (2012) Columbia Business Law Review Online, available at 
http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12449, accessed on 18 August 2013. 
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litigators will be attempting to establish if their own jurisdictions permit the 
replication of the novel Bathurst findings, the ratings agencies will be scrambling to 
shore up their legal defences to potential exposure and the investment banks will be 
taking note of the consequences for their own operations, the fate of which has 
become deeply enmeshed with the ratings agencies.  
This paper will show that the legal questions at play here are not merely 
academic. They have real-world consequences and will continue to do so for some 
time to come as market participants attempt to understand them and deal with their 
litigation and compliance risks. In an abstract economic sense, the argument for the 
appropriate participation of ratings agencies in capital markets should not be 
underemphasised. In the best case, rating agencies are indirectly responsible for the 
market’s efficient allocation of capital by reducing the asymmetry of information 
inherent in a lender-borrower relationship.7 But in the worst case, where they fail in 
this role, the information they provide is inaccurate, unreliable and contributes to 
investors allocating capital to debtors who default on their obligations more readily 
than the terms of their agreements had priced in.8 This is an obvious problem for any 
market system that aims to allocate capital efficiently, and of course it is a problem 
for market participants who rely on ratings to their detriment.  
Just how significant is the function that ratings agencies perform in the global 
financial system? The three largest rating agencies are tremendously powerful and 
they are defendants with very deep pockets. 9 The ‘big three’ together own 95% of 
the ratings market and in 2007 shared total revenues of over $6 billion.10 They are 
                                                
7 Nan S. Ellis, Lisa M. Fairchild & Frank D’Souza ‘Is imposing liability on credit rating agencies a 
good idea?: Credit rating agency reform in the aftermath of the global financial crisis’ (2012) 17 
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance 175 at 179. 
8 Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 179 
9 New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman said in 1996 that ‘There are two superpowers in the 
world today in my opinion. There's the United States and there's Moody's Bond Rating Service. The 
United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody's can destroy you by downgrading 
your bonds. And believe me, it's not clear sometimes who's more powerful.’ See Roger Lowenstein 
‘Triple-A failure’ New York Times, 27 April 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/27/magazine/27Credit-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, accessed on 
22 July 2013. 
10 Cyrus Sanati ‘Ratings agencies draw fire on capitol hill’ New York Times, 22 October 2008, 
available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/rating-agencies-draw-fire-capitol-hill/ accessed 
on 20 July 2013. It is interesting that while there are over 150 credit rating agencies globally, the so-
called “Big 3”—Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services, Moody’s Investor’s Service and Fitch 
Ratings—together hold more than 95% of the market in a highly oligopolistic system. Each of the Big 
3 has an office and operations in South Africa. 
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also deeply ingrained in society’s consciousness, having existed in the United States 
since the 1840s when they were called mercantile agencies and in the form that we 
think of them today since the founding by John Moody of the original Moody’s in 
1909.11 Given the massive scope of their operations in a modern, interconnected 
economy, the major ratings agencies face legal exposure in many jurisdictions, 
including South Africa. This dissertation is an attempt to clarify the circumstances in 
which a South African court will hold a credit ratings agency liable to the purchaser 
of a structured credit product for losses caused by their reliance on negligently 
compiled ratings that are inaccurate. 
Chapter 2 begins with an examination of the functions of credit rating 
agencies on a micro scale and then in the context of a globally integrated financial 
system. This is necessary because any appreciation of the liability that might attach 
to their opinions must flow from an understanding of the unique problems that arise 
because of how they conduct their business. Chapter 3 argues that rating agencies 
played a central role in the financial crisis (indeed, there is in fact a growing body of 
evidence that the ratings agencies themselves have made significant admissions in 
this regard).12 Chapter 4 provides an overview of the newly promulgated Credit 
Ratings Services Act.13 Chapter 5 is an examination of the liability regime envisaged 
by the Act in respect of rating agencies who cause investors to suffer pure economic 
losses and an application of how those principles might be applied by a court. 
Chapter 6 is a comparative perspective on the approaches to rating agency liability in 
selected common law jurisdictions, specifically Australia, England and the United 
States, with a special focus on lessons and principles that may be relevant to the 
South African situation. Chapter 7 contains some general reflections about civil 
liability as a deterrent against negligence in the context of capital market 
‘gatekeepers’ and the wisdom of a legal system appearing to forsake the fundamental 
principle of caveat emptor. Finally, Chapter 8 contains some tentative conclusions 
                                                
11 Jakob de Haan & Fabian Amtenbrink ‘Credit Rating Agencies’ (2011) De Nederlandsche Bank 
Working Paper No. 278 at 1. 
12 Noemi Blumberg, Joanna Wirth & Nikita Litsoukov ‘The liability of credit rating agencies to 
investors: a review of the current liability regime and recent SEC proposals’ 2011 The Journal of 
Structured Finance 34. The authors refer to leaked internal emails that make frank admissions about 
agencies’ incompetence and lack of independence. 
13 No. 24 of 2012. 
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about what the future may hold for plaintiff investors and rating agency defendants, 
as well as some recommendations for the application of judicial standards. 
2. Credit rating agencies as financial intermediaries 
What is it that credit ratings agencies do, and why do they do it? In answering these 
questions it is highly instructive to consider, first, the theoretical arguments for 
ratings agencies’ participation in capital markets and, second, the extent to which the 
application of those arguments in reality diverges from their theoretical case. Such 
an analysis reveals that the de facto role occupied by ratings agencies is highly 
determinative of a debtor’s success in raising capital, and that certain structural 
features of their operations give rise to unique problems of independency that are 
difficult to mitigate. 
2.1. The economic case for credit rating agencies 
In theory, the role of credit rating agencies is simply to facilitate the efficient 
allocation of credit between lenders and borrowers by increasing the level of 
transparency in a particular capital market.14 This is best thought of as a mechanism 
whereby the overall cost of information to traders of financial products is lowered,15 
the central idea being that rating agencies facilitate a flow of information by 
analysing all available data and delivering it in digestible quantities much more 
affordably than if each investor attempted to perform the same level of research on 
their own.16  
To see the merit in this, consider a situation in which rating agencies are 
absent from the financial system.17 If we assume that investors are risk-averse but 
profit seeking (that is, they always prefer capital protection and will only permit 
more risk when it is matched with higher returns), they would need to use their own 
resources and efforts in assessing debtors before making any investments. There is 
academic consensus that the investor in such a hypothetical situation would consider 
                                                
14 Andrea Migliocino ‘Enhancing the regulation of credit rating agencies, in search of a method’ 
Centre for financial and management studies: working paper (July 2012) 61 available at 
http://www.cefims.ac.uk/cgi-bin/research.cgi?id=99 accessed on 17 September 2013.  
15 Gregory Husisian ‘What standard of care should govern the world’s shortest editorials? An analysis 
of bond rating agency liability’ 1990 (75) Cornell Law Review 411 415; Ronald Gilson & Reinier 
Kraakman ‘Mechanisms of market efficiency’ 70 (1984) Virginia Law Review 549 594. 
16 Gilson & Kraakman op cite note 15 at 594.  
17 Husisian op cit note 15 at 417. 
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the benefit of the necessary research to be too small to justify the significant costs in 
money and time—returns in a highly complex, diffuse bond market are already 
always small and investors are often unsophisticated.18 These high information costs 
are prohibitive for debtors wishing to raise capital too, because it requires that they 
increase their issuing costs by embarking on marketing projects to encourage 
investors to subscribe for their debt securities.19 Thus, high information costs have 
negative implications for the system as a whole: debt issuers are forced to increase 
the costs of their operations and potential investors are prone to stay in the least risky 
investments and thereby stifle the optimum allocation of the market’s savings.  
In light of this, the role of ratings agencies is to work to reduce these 
information costs and increase efficiency in capital markets. They do this in practice 
by employing experts in mathematical and statistical modelling who publish 
opinions about a debtor’s credit risk (generally or with regard to a particular 
financial instrument), that is, how likely it is that a debtor will repay its creditors.20 
The entire market benefits from the economies of scale generated by the 
centralisation of research resources in the agencies themselves.21 Potential creditors 
who come into in possession of a debor’s credit rating are better equipped to assess 
the risk of lending to that debtor and what the appropriate commercial terms of 
finance should be, the rating agencies target their analyses optimally and the market 
adjusts prices quickly as a consequence of the rapid distribution of information.22   
2.2. How opinions are provided 
Credit rating agencies express their ratings of the credit risk of a debtor by means of 
a symbolic representation, almost always as a score on an alphabetical scale of letters 
and symbols. The categories used by the dominant market participants are shown in 
Table 1 below.23 A scoring on this scale is supposed to provide a shortcut in the 
evaluation of a financial instrument’s credit risk such that investors can be confident 
that a debtor or debt security that receives a particular rating will share the 
                                                
18 Husisian op cit note 15 at 418. 
19 Husisian op cit note 15 at 419. 
20 Rachel Jones ‘The need for a negligence standard of care for credit rating agencies’ (2010) 1 
William & Mary Business Law Review 201 at 202.  
21 Arthur R. Pinto ‘Control and responsibility of credit rating agencies in the United States’ (2006) 54 
American Journal of Comparative Law at 341; Husisian op cit note 15 at 421. 
22 Husisian op cit note 15 at 421. 
23 De Haan & Amtenbrink op cit note 15 at 6. 
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characteristics that are ordinarily assigned to a particular rating.24 Despite the fact 
that the rating agencies almost always try to divest investors of the notion that 
ratings are buy/sell/hold recommendations, it is generally accepted that ratings are a 
critical component in ordinary investors’ strategies. This culture of reliance is 
embedded in the financial system to the extent that many institutional funds are 
bound by strict investment rules that outright prevent them from buying debt below a 
certain rating.25 It is important to point out that rating agencies do not claim to 
perform an independent verification of the data they work with. In this way, they 
purport to distinguish their work from that of auditors.26 
Interpretation Fitch and S&P Moody’s 
Highest quality AAA Aaa 
High quality AA+ Aa1 
AA Aa2 
AA- Aa3 
Strong payment capacity A+ A1 
A A2 
A- A3 
Adequate payment capacity BBB+ Baa1 
BBB Baa2 
BBB- Baa3 
Likely to fulfil obligations, 
ongoing uncertainty 
BB+ Ba1 
BB Ba2 
BB- Ba3 
High risk obligations B+ B1 
B B2 
B- B3 
Vulnerable to default CCC+ Caa1 
CCC Caa2 
CCC- Caa3 
Near or in bankruptcy or 
default 
CC Ca 
C C 
D D 
 
Table 1 
 
                                                
24 Alessandro Scarso ‘The liability of credit rating agencies in comparative perspective’ (2013) 4(2) 
Journal of European Tort Law 163 at 164. 
25 Husisian op cit note 15 at 424. 
26 Whether they are successful in doing so is a matter of some debate. See e.g. Blumberg op cit note 
12 at 34. 
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2.3. The gatekeeping function of ratings agencies 
In spite of the rating agencies’ express statements to the contrary, their function in 
the capital markets has been described as of a similar nature to accountants and 
certain other financial professionals because of the ‘protection’ they supposedly 
provide to public investors.27 Just as auditors certify that a firm’s accounting records 
accurately reflect the financial affairs of a business, it is indisputable that credit 
rating agencies provide a kind of certification with regards to debtor’s credit 
quality,28 where a credit rating is perceived to provide an official ‘seal of approval’.29 
Thus, there is an implicit ‘bond of trust’ between investors and credit rating 
agencies, 30  and credit rating agencies can thus be described as fulfilling a 
‘gatekeeping’ function by contributing to the market’s integrity.31 It is easy to 
understand the appropriateness of this metaphor: if enough ratings agencies withhold 
a particular certification desired in respect of a debtor or its securities, the proverbial 
‘gate is shut’ and the debtor’s access to the capital markets is completely cut off.32  
As suggested above, the agencies themselves would point out that while there 
may some similarities in this regard, they “do not audit companies, offer advice, or 
recommend certain products”.33 At most, they would argue, they give opinions.34 
That being said, the market treats them differently.35 Whether they desire the burden 
or not, it is inherent in the institutional structure of modern capital markets that credit 
rating agencies have been assigned the role of risk assessors.36 This has led to a 
situation where rating agencies occupy a ‘quasi-public’ position because their 
assessments impact directly on the interest rates that borrower companies and 
governments must pay.37 As one author argues,38 the agencies themselves have only 
                                                
27 Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 177. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Tobias Johannson ‘Regulating credit rating agencies: the issue of conflicts of interest in the rating 
of structured credit products’ (2010) 12(1) Journal of Banking Regulation 1 at 2. 
30 Johannson op cite note 29 at 2. 
31 Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 176. 
32 Sung Hui Kim ‘Gatekeepers inside and out’ (2008) 21 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 411 at 
415.  
33 Jones op cit note 20 at 202. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Dieter Kerwer, ‘Holding global regulators accountable: the case of credit rating agencies’ (2005) 
18(3) Governance: an international journal of policy, administration and institutions 453 at 470. 
36 Kerwer op cit note 35 at 470. 
37 Husisian op cite note 15 at 424. Hugh Sherwood ‘How corporate and municipal debt is rated: an 
inside at Standard and Poor’s rating system’ 32(5) (1977) The Journal of Finance 1828. 
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partially accepted this role, leading to a stark divergence of views with regards to 
how much liability their opinions should attract.39  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
2.4. Structural problems associated with ratings agencies 
The global financial crisis demonstrated the mission-critical nature of properly 
functioning capital markets in the modern global economy. 40  It has been 
compellingly argued that there are three instruments universally necessary for the 
maintenance of properly functioning capital markets: (a) avoiding conflicts of 
interest, (b) duties of disclosure and (c) adequate supervision.41 A deficiency in any 
of these components can have deleterious effects on the integrity of a capital market 
and contribute to its operating sub-optimally. In the sub-section that follows I will 
canvass each of these elements more extensively to demonstrate the extent to which 
the rating agencies as capital markets participants are mired in unique, structural 
problems.42 
                                                                                                                                     
38 Sherwood op cit note 37 at 1828. 
39 Cf. Harry Edwards, ‘CRA 3 and the liability of rating agencies: inconsistent messages from the 
regulation on credit rating agencies in Europe’ 2013 Law and Financial Markets Review 186 at 188 
(opposed to liability) and Ellis op cit note 7 (in favour of liability). 
40 See Chapter 3 infra. 
41 Thomas Möllers ‘Regulating credit rating agencies – the new United States and European Union 
law – important steps or much ado about nothing?’ (2009) 4 Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg 674 
at 677. 
42 Ibid at 677-678. 
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2.4.1. Conflicts of interest 
The conflict of interest problem is one that is very familiar to all legal systems. The 
classic response to this problem is the carving out of a framework of fiduciary duties 
with remedies for their breach.43 Certain categories are well established already: 
directors, trustees, agents and partners owe fiduciary duties to companies, 
beneficiaries, principals and other partners, respectively, by virtue of the position 
they occupy in relation to the affairs of that other legal person. The principle that 
governs this classic corporate governance problem is well founded in our law. 
Fiduciaries stand in positions of significant power with regards to their principal’s 
affairs, thus they must always act in the best interests of their principal.44 This is an 
absolute duty, one manifestation of which is that fiduciaries must seek to avoid 
conflicts between their interests and those of their principals. What is clear from the 
authorities, however, is that the rules governing conflicts of interest are not isolated 
to particular types of relationships, their extension from trust law to company law 
being ample evidence of this. We are therefore in familiar legal territory when 
looking at conflicts of interest in novel situations. 
In the context of ratings agencies, the most obvious and important conflict of 
interest arises in the case where a debt issuer contracts with a rating agency to rate 
one of its securities that it is intending to market for subscription in accordance with 
the ‘issuer pays’ model.45 This model is a relatively recent development but is now 
the market standard.46 Before this model became dominant, ratings were issued by 
agencies to, and for the benefit of, potential subscribers of debt securities. 47 
However, the capital markets evolved and investors increasingly demanded that 
securities issuers retain at least one rating to be eligible for subscription. 48 
                                                
43 Lu Zhang & Yanyan Xing, ‘Brief analysis on conflicts of interest of credit rating agencies’ (2012) 
8(4) Canadian Social Science 144 at 145. 
44 This has been the position in common law jurisdictions since the seminal decision of Lord King in 
the trust law case Keech v Sandford [1726] EWHC Ch J76. 
45 Frank Partnoy ‘How and why credit rating agencies are not like other gatekeepers’ in Yasuyuki 
Fuchita, Robert E. Litan, eds Financial gatekeepers: can they protect investors? 1ed 2006; John 
Coffee ‘The mortgage meltdown and gatekeeper failure’ (2007) New York Law Journal 2. 
46 Claire Hill ‘Why did rating agencies do such a bad job rating subprime securities’ 2010 (71) 
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 585 at 595. 
47 Hill op cite note 46 at 595. 
48 Marilyn Cane, Adam Shamir & Tomas Jodar ‘Below investment grade and above the law: a past, 
present, and future look at the accountability of credit rating agencies’ (2011) Fordham Journal of 
Corporate and Financial Law 5. 
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Compounding this were problems associated with preventing subscribers from 
disseminating the ratings to non-subscribers and thereby making the ratings public 
(and therefore free) information. 49  Whatever its provenance, the ‘issuer pays’ 
business model has firmly taken root and appears to be here to stay. It is in this 
model that there is clear a divergence of interests. On the one hand, the rating agency 
is under a professional (and often contractual) duty to rate the particular debt security 
accurately, even if that means giving the debt securities issuer, who is also a client, a 
lower rating than they might have desired. But, on the other hand, the rating agency 
is also incentivised by commercial reasons to keep the client happy so that they will 
bring back business in the future.50 This gives rise to an associated problem of 
‘forum shopping’, where because the debt securities issuer is required to pay for its 
ratings, generally it will solicit several ‘quotations’ from ratings agencies and select 
the ‘highest of the lowest’, with negligible regard to accuracy, its focus rather being 
trained on price and the perceived value (or positivity of rating) only.51  
The situation just described is the conflict of interest problem in the context 
of rating agencies in its simplest form. However, several realities of the modern debt 
capital market compound it and deeply enmesh associated problems. First, as 
suggested above, particular classes of investors are often bound to purchase only 
‘investment grade’ products for their portfolios, for example large, institutional 
pension funds and insurers. These investors are where, by far, the bulk of the 
market’s capital lies, and debt securities issuers are perpetually engaged in 
competition for their funds. The consequence of a high concentration of capital being 
subject to stringent investment rules is that market participants are incentivised, and 
often required, to only buy and only market securities that are rated as being 
investment grade.  
Second, structured finance products are created and issued by only a handful 
of investment banks that pay fees to rating agencies to rate them.52 The proportion of 
                                                
49 Timothy Lynch ‘Deeply and persistently conflicted: credit rating agencies in the current regulatory 
environment’ 59 (2009) Case Western Reserve Law Review 227 at 239. 
50 Lisbeth Freeman ‘Who’s guarding the gate? Credit-rating agency liability as “control person” in the 
subprime credit crisis’ (2009) 33 Vermont Law Review 585 at 600.  
51 Hill op cit note 46 at 585. 
52 Joseph Mason & Joshua Rosner ‘Where did the risk go? How misapplied bond ratings cause 
mortgage backed securities and collateralized debt obligation market disruptions’ (unpublished draft), 
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rating agencies’ income attributable to structured finance products has increased 
significantly in recent times and this has resulted in a situation where, in the eyes of 
the ratings agencies, there is a disproportionately high concentration of earnings 
capacity in very few investment bank clients, increasing the banks’ perceived and 
real influence over the ratings agencies.53 Third, the rise in popularity of structured 
finance products has also seen a rise in the role played by ratings agencies in the 
actual composition and design of those products. In these situations the rating agency 
adopts a quasi advisory/consultancy role, with the attendant danger that they will be 
hesitant to act impartially in their capacity as an independent rating agency should 
circumstances change for the worse. It is certainly not obvious, at least, that they 
would act against their earlier advices to the contrary without any hesitation.54  
It is submitted that these factors suggest that the independence of rating 
agencies is perhaps a something of an ideal. As this paper will show, the extent to 
which a particular ratings agency defendant is alive to these problems and attempts 
to minimise their impact is almost certainly something that a court will take into 
account when making a determination as to the wrongfulness element of a delictual 
claim by a disappointed investor.55 
2.4.2. Disclosure of methodologies 
A cornerstone of capital market efficiency is that participants are all operating within 
the bounds of the same informational constraints. This is so in order to enable the 
price mechanism to most accurately reflect disagreements on value.56 This may seem 
counterintuitive, but consider, for example, that for every trade that is executed on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, there is an agreement on the price of the security 
to be traded but a disagreement on value. Both sides of any transaction believe they 
are getting the better deal. If the information is asymmetrical, however, one side of a 
transaction has an advantage that enables it to profit at the expense of the 
counterparty. Governments view this situation as market abuse, giving rise in nearly 
                                                                                                                                     
May 2007, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1027475, accessed 15 
October 2013. 
53 Coffee op cit note 43. 
54 Coffee op cit note 43.  
55 See 5.2.3 infra. 
56 Möllers op cite note 41 at 677. 
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all jurisdictions to laws that try to proscribe the efforts of “insiders” to trade with the 
benefit of such one-sided information.57  
This is relevant in our context because the ratings agencies only sometimes 
disclose their precise modelling methodologies.58 Often they provide only a mere 
summary rationale of the analysis employed, leaving much to speculation.59 This 
partial disclosure of ratings methodologies, for business reasons or otherwise, brings 
with it obvious problems for capital market efficiency since any hindrance to 
relevant information being factored into a market price obscures the true value of an 
investment.60 
2.4.3. Adequacy of supervision 
Ratings agencies, up until recently, were subject to no other regulation than the 
maintenance of their own reputations in accordance with the reputational capital 
theory.61 Thus, regulatory frameworks under which the ratings agencies received 
proper supervision by public law authorities simply never existed.62 It has been 
argued that the stakes are simply too high in the context of the maintenance of stable 
and functional capital markets for there to not be any preventative public law 
regulation and supervision of ratings agencies,63 the idea being that deterrent civil 
law remedies, like claims for damages in cases of negligence, are insufficient 
safeguards. As will be discussed later in this paper, the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is currently taking steps to ensure that member 
states adhere to particular standards of regulatory supervision.64 
2.5. Regulation—from within or without? 
The economic function that credit rating agencies perform is clearly important, and 
as academics have rightly pointed out, we would justifiably assume that the activities 
                                                
57 For the recently revised South African position on insider trading see the Financial Markets Act 19 
of 2012.  
58 Lynch op cit note 49 at 238. 
59 Cane, Shamir & Jodar op cit note 48 at 5. 
60 Möllers op cite note 41 at 677; Eugene Fama ‘Efficient capital markets: a review of theory and 
empirical work’ (1970) Journal of Finance at 83. 
61 See 2.5 infra. 
62 Möllers op cit note 41. 
63 Möllers op cite note 41 at 678; Jackson & Roe ‘Public enforcement of securities laws: resource-
based evidence’ Harvard Public Law Working Paper no 08-28 (2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract1000086, accessed on 10 August 2013. 
64 See 4.1 infra. 
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of ratings agencies would be highly regulated, as it is in the case of the accounting 
profession.65 But until very recently, credit rating agencies around the world were 
largely left to their own devices, the idea being that credit rating agencies are 
commercial enterprises themselves and the need to maintain their good reputation 
would serve as the ultimate regulator of their activities.66 This view suggests that 
there is an internal market mechanism inherent in the economics of a rating agency 
as a profit-seeking business that incentivises it to guard and maintain its ‘reputational 
capital’, thereby ensuring that it will always act in the best interests of market 
participants.67 The so-called ‘reputational capital theory’ therefore holds that each 
rating agency is motivated by reason of profit to ensure the provision of accurate 
ratings. If they provide inaccurate ratings, debtors who contract them for their 
services and investors who rely on their ratings will lose trust in them and this will 
result in an undesirable loss of business.68 Accordingly, reputational capital theory 
says that this market mechanism should provide a compelling motivation for ratings 
agencies to resist any conflict of interest pressures and to perform thorough due 
diligences and conservative risk analyses.69  
Despite the logical appeal of reputational capital theory, in practice it appears 
to have been an insufficient safeguard against damaging negligence, particularly in 
light of the fallout from the financial crisis.70 It has been argued that four main 
reasons are responsible for the failure of reputational capital theory to properly 
regulate the ratings industry.71 First, in recent years there has been an embedded 
culture of regulatory dependence on ratings agencies, whereby institutional investors 
were relying on ratings not for accuracy but in a kind of ‘box ticking’ exercise for 
compliance reasons.72 The unintended but perverse effect of this was to diminish the 
value of rating agencies as informational intermediaries and to guarantee demand for 
their ratings services, sometimes in spite of their inaccuracy. Second, there is a 
                                                
65 Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 180.  
66 Ibid. 
67 Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 180 at 211; Husisian op cit note 15 at 425. 
68 Kia Dennis ‘The ratings game: explaining rating agency failures in the build up to the financial 
crisis’ 63 (2009) University of Miami Law Review 1111 1130; Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 
7 at 212. 
69 Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 212. 
70 Kim op cit note 26 at 424; Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 212. 
71 Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 214. 
72 Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 214. 
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misalignment in the short-term payoff associated with providing a rapid but 
inaccurate rating, because reputational damage accrues over a much longer time 
frame.73 Third, the opacity of the structured credit market and the speed with which 
entirely novel classes of product are developed mean that it is very hard to gauge ex 
ante what might constitute inaccuracy in a rating, from anyone’s perspective (expert 
or not).74 Finally, given the tendency for rating agencies to be involved in both the 
rating of debt and increasingly the composition and creation of novel structured 
finance products in a ‘consulting’ role with their clients, it is quite clear that there are 
in reality multiple reputations at stake: rating agencies want to be seen as both 
prudent and accurate in their monitoring function, but also innovative, inventive and 
creative in their advisory roles.75 
 
 
 
 
                                                
73 John Crawford ‘Hitting the sweet spot by accident: how recent lower court cases help realign 
incentives in the credit rating industry’42 (2009) Connecticut Law Review 13 at 17. 
74 Frank Partnoy ‘Barbarians at the gatekeepers? A proposal for a modified strict liability regime’ 79 
(2001) Washington University Law Quaterly 491 at 509. 
75 John Coffee ‘What went wrong? A tragedy in three acts’ 6 (2009) University of St Thomas Law 
Journal 403 at 406; Johannson op cit note 29 at 5. 
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3. How important were rating agencies in the 2007/8 financial crisis? 
3.1. The financial crisis as a housing crisis 
The 2008 financial crisis was doubtless the outcome of myriad compounding 
factors,76 many of which have received extensive academic attention.77 The crisis 
had, and continues to have, devastating economic consequences for a large number 
of countries, firms and people.78 There is consensus that the roots of the crisis can be 
traced to a culture in the United States of commercial banks lending to borrowers 
who were not creditworthy (hence the term “sub-prime”).79 Banks were lending to 
sub-prime borrowers because interest rates were very low and debtors could 
generally be expected to be able to meet unusually relaxed repayment obligations. In 
fact, it was not uncommon for United States banks to be so lax in their credit checks 
that mortgages were in some instances even granted to ‘NINJAS’ (persons with No 
Income, No Job or Assets).80 Thus, the financial crisis was arguably at heart a 
housing crisis.81 Buyers were purchasing homes they could ill-afford because finance 
was so cheap. The increased supply of money led to a higher demand for real estate 
and a property boom in the years 2000 – 2006.82 In response to this investment and 
expenditure boom the Federal Reserve (the United States’ central bank) began a 
process of raising interest rates in a bid to decelerate bank borrowing and spending.83 
This is what eventually caused the housing market bubble to burst in 2007.84 
3.2. Securitisation 
In the lead-in to the housing bubble bursting, many of the mortgages used to finance 
property transactions were extensively ‘securitised’ by investment banks. 85 
‘Securitisation’ is nowadays a common market practice. It is best understood as a 
process of converting assets into new products (asset backed securities (ABSs)) that 
                                                
76 AP Faure ‘Fundamentals of the Financial System’ in Karin van Wyk, Ziets Botha & Ingrid 
Goodspeed (eds) Understanding South African Financial Markets 4 ed 2012 1 at 32. 
77 Möllers op cit note 41 at 674.  
78 Faure op cit note 76 at 34. 
79 Freeman op cit note 50 at 586. 
80 Möllers op cit note 41 at 674; Kurt Eggert ‘The great collapse: how securitization caused the 
subprime meltdown’ (2009) 41 Connecticut Law Review 1257 at 1286. 
81 Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 192; Eamonn K. Moran ‘Wall Street meets main street: 
understanding the financial crisis’ (2009) 13 North Carolina Banking Institute Journal 5 at 42. 
82 Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 193; Moran op cit note 81 at 20. 
83 Faure op cit note 76 at 33. 
84 Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 197. 
85 Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 193. 
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can be further traded. In general this process has three stages:86 (i) the bringing 
together of a group of income-producing assets which share the same characteristics 
(usually debts on which interest is received), (ii) the sale of those assets by the 
original holder (the creditor) to an insolvency-remote “special purpose vehicle” 
(SPV), and (iii) the issue by the SPV of marketable securities (usually debt) to 
finance the purchase of the assets.87 In the context of mortgages on immoveable 
property, loan originators sold individual mortgages into a pool of “mortgaged-
backed securities” (MBSs) or “collateralised debt obligations” (CDOs), housed in 
SPVs that issued debt securities with the mortgages serving as security.88 The 
benefits to creditors (for example, home loan originators) in this process are obvious. 
Instead of having to wait 20 or 30 years to be paid back by debtors, banks could have 
their capital stores replenished at a much quicker rate and thus be in position to write 
new loans sooner.89 This “repackaging” of pooled loans is what gives rise to their 
label as a type of “structured finance product”.  
In the years leading up to the financial crisis these particular kinds of 
structured finance products were sold to investors all over the world.90 When the 
market disruption took hold in 2007/2008 the default experience on these types of 
debt securities was so severe that it affected even AAA-rated structured finance 
products that were held by investors who were highly geographically dispersed.91 
Securitisation was thus critical for ensuring that the financial crisis’s contagion 
spread very much more widely than the market from which it originated, affecting 
exponentially more people and firms, and, as importantly, ensuring that investors’ 
understanding of the default risks of the securities they were acquiring was obscured. 
3.3. Rating agencies and the rise of structured finance products 
Rating agencies are fundamentally involved in the rating, marketing (and, as 
suggested above, oftentimes the creation) of structured finance products. However, 
in theory, their role is to act as independent third parties who are consulted in order 
                                                
86 These stages can be, and indeed very often are, significantly more complex, but the definition 
provided captures the general essence. See Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 193. 
87 Natania Locke Aspects of traditional securitisation in South African law (doctoral thesis, University 
of South Africa 2008) 30. 
88 Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 193. 
89 Lowenstein op cit note 9. 
90 Möllers op cit note 41 at 675. 
91 Faure op cit note 76 at 34. 
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to balance informational differences that arise between lenders and borrowers, 
according to standardised categorisations of risk of default (see Table 1 above).92 As 
explained above, these categorisations are assigned to debtors and/or their structured 
products using highly complex mathematical and statistical models based on the 
historical performance of a certain category of assets.93 In the special case of 
structured finance products, the agencies ordinarily rate the credit risk associated 
with a particular class of CDOs housed in an SPV, which ratings are in turn 
extensively utilised by investors when making their capital allocation decisions.94 
There is academic consensus that in the period before the financial crisis credit rating 
agencies were overly optimistic in their assessment of CDO credit risk arising from 
structured finance products backed by sub-prime mortgages. 95  This was as a 
consequence of inter alia the inclusion of problematic assumptions in statistical 
models, the structurally problematic role occupied by rating agencies, and the unique 
pressures on ratings agency staff both caused and exacerbated by the rapid rise in 
securitisation in the run up to the financial crisis.96  
That being said, the most important consequence of credit rating agencies 
giving overly generous ratings was that institutional investors (who are bound by 
very rigid investment rules) were acquiring structured finance products that were 
inherently very risky on the basis of their being rated as “investment grade”.97 In the 
run-in to the crisis it was not uncommon for CDOs comprising the riskiest sub-prime 
assets to be repackaged by investment banks in such a way that eighty per cent of a 
particular structure could still be assigned an AAA rating,98 signifying the highest 
quality of debtor.  
3.4. The bubble bursts 
Had the ratings agencies carried out their work with the requisite due diligence, 
proper analysis of these structured finance products could have, and should have, 
                                                
92 See 2.2 infra. 
93 Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 200. 
94 Natania Locke, ‘The role of rating agencies in the course of a securitization scheme’ (2008) De 
Jure 545 at 550. 
95 Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 196. 
96 Richard E. Mendales ‘Collateralized ecplosive devices: why securities regulation failed to prevent 
the CDO meltdown, and how to fix it’ (2009) 5 University of Illinois Law Review 1359 at 1380. 
97 Möllers op cit note 41 at 676. 
98 Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 196; Möllers op cit note 41 at 676. 
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limited the fallout when the bubble burst.99 But as suggested above, this was not the 
case. When the housing bubble eventually burst in 2007, the so-called chickens came 
home to roost for holders of mortgage-backed securities who saw their payments and 
capital evaporate as a consequence of the widespread defaults, often completely.100 
Some institutions that were particularly exposed to these securities, like Lehman 
Brothers and Bear Sterns, and latterly Northern Rock in the UK, collapsed as 
consequence of the plummeting value of their assets. Others, in particular those that 
were considered to be ‘systemically important financial institutions’ (SIFIs), were 
bailed out by their governments.101  
Despite overwhelming evidence of the increasing number of subprime 
borrowers defaulting and the concomitant depression in the strength of the MBSs, 
credit rating agencies have been castigated because they initially did not revise their 
ratings downward, even when the extent of the financial crisis became clear.102 It 
was only after significant public pressure that the rating agencies relented and 
downgraded many of their overly optimistic ratings, in some cases by more than five 
notches in one leap.103 If this situation was confined to the US alone, that would have 
been the end of the matter and the financial crisis that ensued when the central bank 
increased interest rates would have been a crisis for the US financial markets only. 
However, as explained above, massive advances in communications and technology 
have meant that global capital markets in the modern era are highly interconnected 
and interdependent, thus the on-selling of these MBSs to investors all over the world 
guaranteed that the financial crisis was truly global.104 These “toxic assets” are now 
firmly rooted in the balance sheets of financial institutions around the world, and in 
the case where a financial institution survived the crisis, they are likely unable to be 
traded away at all.105  
It is this situation that gave rise to what has been popularly described as the 
global “credit crunch”, where institutional investors were forced to restrict their 
                                                
99 Möllers op cit note 41 at 677. 
100 Lowenstein op cit note 9. 
101 Faure op cit note 76 at 34. 
102 Möllers op cit note 41 at 676. 
103 For example, Fitch downgraded GMAC Financial Services from BB- to CCC in November 2008, 
an unprecedented jump. See e.g. Möllers op cit note 41 at 676. 
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lending activities and seek additional capital in order to meet regulatory capital and 
liquidity requirements.106 The effect of this was self-reinforcing and in a very short 
space of time the availability of credit effectively dried up. This evaporation of 
capital from the capital markets guaranteed an unprecedented global economic 
slowdown, which was certainly borne out in reality.  
3.5. The impact of the financial crisis on South Africa 
In spite of the pervasiveness of the global financial crisis, South Africa’s exposure 
was thankfully less severe than a large number of other countries.107 National 
Treasury has attributed this to five main factors: (i) sound financial regulation that 
did not rest on the ‘light touch’ principle favoured by other states, (ii) limited foreign 
asset exposure owing to strict foreign exchange controls, (iii) appropriate bank risk 
management, (iv) ring-fencing of balance sheets of foreign banks operating locally, 
and (v) high levels of disclosure and corporate governance under the JSE’s listing 
requirements. 108 While these factors certainly helped to limit the extent of the crisis 
in South Africa, our economy remains small and open, and thus highly susceptible to 
external shocks.109 Consequently, the government has prioritised strengthening of the 
financial regulatory system in order to prevent a ‘body blow’ from similar events in 
the future.  
Proposals that are to be implemented include, firstly, moves to change to a 
macroprudential approach to regulation that analyses the interconnected financial 
system in its entirety (as opposed to a microscopic focus on individual firms and 
institutions), and, secondly, establishing a ‘twin peaks’ regulatory framework that 
separates prudential regulation on the one hand (soundness and solvency of financial 
institutions, to be monitored by the Reserve Bank), from market conduct regulation 
(consumer welfare, monitored by the Financial Services Board (FSB)) on the 
                                                
106 Justin Lahart et al ‘World economy shows new strain; European output shrinks; US inflation 
jumps; fresh worries in developing nations’ (2008) Wall Street Journal available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB121874575081241907, accessed on 15 October 2013.  
107 Karin van Wyk ‘Regulation of the financial markets’ in van Wyk, Botha & Goodspeed op cit note 
76 at 122. 
108 National Treasury discussion document ‘A safer financial sector to serve South Africa better’ 
(2011) available at http://www.oecd.org/site/iops/research/48464023.pdf accessed on 15 August 
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other.110 This change will take hold in parallel with other moves to expand the 
boundary of financial regulation to include activity in the financial markets that was 
previously unregulated, especially the market for over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives,111 and, most importantly for present purposes, the activities of credit 
rating agencies.112 
3.6. Ratings agencies and financial system reform 
After the fallout from global financial crisis had begun to settle, the Group of 20 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (the G-20) met on multiple occasions 
to discuss and ensure a uniform, cohesive response to prevent a similar economic 
meltdown from occurring again. The major goals of this co-ordinated response were 
to improve transparency, mitigate systemic risk and put in place appropriate market 
abuse prevention measures.113  
With regards to rating agencies in particular, the sixth standing committee of 
IOSCO published a set of principles for guidance of members as early as 2003, the 
idea being that compliance would serve the three broader “core objectives of 
securities regulations” that were identified by IOSCO, specifically, “improving 
investor protection, ensuring that securities markets are fair, efficient and transparent 
and reducing systemic risk”. 114 With these objectives in mind, IOSCO settled on 
four rating agency principles. These principles are “(i) quality and integrity in the 
rating process, (ii) independence and managing conflicts of interest, (iii) 
transparency and timeliness of ratings disclosure, and (iv) maintenance of 
confidential information”.115 These principles were what later formed the basis of the 
IOSCO Code of Conduct.116 The Code of Conduct in relation to rating agencies is 
non-compulsory, the idea being that voluntary compliance is preferred. However, 
this ‘soft’ enforcement mechanism means that rating agencies are requested to 
disclose whether they comply with the standards, and if they do not, they are 
                                                
110 Ibid. 
111 See e.g. the Financial Markets Act No 19 of 2012.  
112 See chapter 4 infra.  
113 Van Wyk op cite note 107 at 111. 
114 See Technical Committee of the Internationalisation of Securities Commissions ‘Credit Rating 
Agencies: Internal Controls Designed to Ensure the Integrity of the Credit Rating Process and 
Procedures to Manage Conflicts of Interest Consultation Report’ available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD380.pdf, accessed on 19 August 2013.  
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requested to explain where they deviate and why.117 This is very similar in practice 
to the regime that governs corporate governance compliance in South Africa under 
King III. Professed and actual compliance brings with it the gains in perceived 
legitimacy that one might expect, while the converse is also true for non-compliance.  
   
4. The Credit Ratings Services Act  
4.1. Introduction 
South Africa is a member state of IOSCO and it is therefore required to adopt at a 
national level its principles and standards, including in relation to the regulation of 
credit rating agencies.118 This obligation, together with a G-20 commitment to 
establish a globally consistent regulatory framework and similar moves by other 
jurisdictions is what motivated the legislature to deliberate on and eventually pass 
the Credit Rating Services Act119 (hereafter ‘the Act’). The Act was assented to on 9 
January 2013 and its date of commencement was 15 April 2013. It is accordingly a 
new piece of legislation that has not yet been litigated in our courts nor received 
much in the way of academic attention. The Act regulates the activities of credit 
rating agencies in South Africa and purports to do so with reference to the objects 
that are expressly stated in Section 2: 120 
“2. Objects of Act.—The objects of this Act are to— 
                                                
117 Ibid. 
118 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘Meeting report on Credit Ratings Services Bill [B8-2012] and 
Financial Markets Bill [B12-2012] National Treasury briefing’ available at 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20121121-credit-rating-services-bill-b8%E2%80%932012-proposed-
section-75-and-financial accessed on 20 July 2013. 
119 No. 24 of 2012. 
120 Preamble to the Act. 
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(a) ensure responsible and accountable credit rating agencies 
(b) protect the integrity, transparency and reliability of the credit 
rating process and credit ratings;  
(c) improve investor protection;  
(d) improve the fairness, efficiency and transparency of financial 
markets; and  
(e) reduce systemic risk.” 
Given the preceding discussion in chapters 2 and 3 about the role of credit 
rating agencies in the financial markets, the fact that the Act expressly recognises the 
need to serve these objectives is laudable. That said, as with the Companies Act,121 
the wisdom of including the Act’s very broad aims within the Act itself (as opposed 
to the preamble or a policy document) is not immediately clear.122 
The Act comprises eight chapters. Chapter 1 contains the relevant definitions, 
objects and application of the Act. Chapter 2 deals with the registration of credit 
rating agencies and sets out the circumstances under which the registration of credit 
rating agencies can be suspended or cancelled. Chapter 3 is concerned with the 
duties of credit rating agencies, the methods to be adopted by credit rating agencies 
when ratings are issued and requirements in relation to those ratings. Chapter 3 
further obliges credit rating agencies to adopt a code of conduct, acquire the 
registrar's approval before outsourcing, 123  make certain disclosures, maintain 
records, publish annual reports, establish and maintain independent compliance 
functions and observe specific accounting and auditing requirements. Chapter 4 lists 
the requirements for the endorsement by credit rating agencies of external credit 
ratings. 124  Chapter 5 sets out the provisions pertaining to the liability and 
                                                
121 No. 71 of 2008. 
122 Farouk Cassim ‘Introduction to the new Companies Act: general overview of the Act’ in Farouk 
Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 1 ed 2011 1 at 4. 
123 ‘Outsource’ is defined in s 1 of the Act to mean “the contracting out of a function to an external 
provider in a manner that may materially impair the quality of the internal control of the registered 
credit rating agency and the ability of the registrar to supervise the compliance of the registered credit 
rating agency with its obligations under this Act”. 
124 S 1 of the Act defines ‘‘external credit rating’’ as “a credit rating issued by an external credit rating 
agency”, while an ‘‘external credit rating agency’’ is in turn defined as “a person who provides credit 
rating services and who is authorised or registered by a regulatory authority to perform credit rating 
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independence of credit rating agencies. Chapter 6 makes provision for the powers 
and functions of the registrar and deputy registrar of Credit rating agencies to 
administer the Act, which powers include the ability to make rules, authorise 
inspections, issue directives and cooperate with other regulatory authorities. Chapter 
7 contains provisions relating to enforcement actions and remedies by inter alia 
empowering the registrar to take civil action in instances of non-compliance with the 
Act and providing specificity with regards to offences and penalties. Chapter 8 
contains ordinary general provisions, including empowerment of the Minister to 
make regulations. Some of the more notable aspects of the Act are dealt with in the 
subsections that follow. 
4.2. Application  
The Act applies to “credit rating services performed in the Republic, credit ratings 
that are issued by credit rating agencies registered in the Republic and any person 
that performs credit rating services or issues credit ratings in the Republic”.125 
Importantly, the Act does not apply to private credit ratings or credit ratings services 
produced pursuant to individual orders and provided exclusively to the person who 
placed the order and which are not intended for public disclosure.126 A wide class of 
persons and activities are envisaged to fall under the Act in accordance with the 
definitions of ‘credit rating’, ‘credit rating agency’ and ‘credit rating services’: 
“credit rating” means an opinion regarding the creditworthiness of— 
(a) an entity; 
(b) a security or a ﬁnancial instrument; or 
(c) an issuer of a security or a ﬁnancial instrument, 
                                                                                                                                     
than the Republic, which laws (a) establish a regulatory framework which is approved by the registrar 
as being equivalent to that established by this Act; and (b) are supervised and monitored by a 
regulatory authority”. 
125 S 3(1). There are currently five credit rating agencies operating in South Africa: Moody's Investor 
Services Limited or Moody's Investor Services South Africa (Pty) Ltd, Fitch Rating Limited or Fitch 
Ratings Southern Africa (Pty) Limited, Standard & Poor's, Global Credit Rating Co and Ratings 
Africa. See Sabinet Bill Tracker ‘Credit Ratings Services Act’ available at 
http://discover.sabinet.co.za/document/BTD10640 accessed on 13 August 2013. 
126 S 3(4). 
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using an established and deﬁned ranking system of rating categories, 
excluding any recommendation to purchase, sell or hold any security 
or ﬁnancial instrument; 
“credit rating agency” means a person who provides credit rating 
services; 
“credit rating services” means data and information analysis, 
evaluation, approval, issuing or review, for the purposes of credit 
ratings. 127 
The legal effect of the Act is that no person who purports to provide credit ratings or 
credit rating services may lawfully do so without evidence of valid registration 
therefor.128 There is thus a legal duty on credit rating agencies to be validly 
registered as such in order to carry on their business in the Republic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.1. Registration 
The Act imposes strict requirements in respect of registration applications. In 
addition to providing for the corporate, personnel and administrative details 
ordinarily associated with any license-type application, 129  the application for 
registration must include details of the credit rating agency’s “policies and 
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procedures” to determine, disclose and manage conflicts of interests,130 details of 
compliance with the code of conduct contemplated in s 11,131 a description of the 
actual procedures and methodologies that are to be used in the review and issue of 
credit ratings,132 and information to the satisfaction of the registrar that the rating 
agency applicant, all directors and its employees satisfy the prescribed ‘fit and 
proper’ requirements concerning personal qualities relating to “honesty and integrity, 
competence, operational ability and financial soundness”. 133  The registrar is 
empowered to grant or refuse applications for registration and retains a general 
discretion to exempt applicants from black letter compliance with the Act,134 
possibly in line with a broader move to favouring “substantial compliance”, as in the 
Companies Act.135 The registrar is also empowered to suspend or cancel registrations 
in certain circumstances.136  
4.2.2. Statutory duties imposed on registered rating agencies 
Registered rating agencies are subject to extensive duties under the Act. These duties 
pertain to informing the registrar of the appointment of directors,137 adhering to the 
stipulated requirements in respect of the methodologies, models and key rating 
assumptions to be used in the issue of ratings and other general requirements. 138 
Registered rating agencies are required to adopt a code of conduct,139 solicit and 
acquire the registrar's approval before attempting to outsource any of the functions it 
would ordinarily perform, 140  make prescribed operational and financial 
disclosures,141 maintain records, publish annual reports and financial statements,142 
and, finally, institute a permanent, independent compliance unit that performs on-
going functions.143  
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132 S 5 (c). 
133 S 5 (d). 
134 S 5(3). 
135 See S 6 (a) & (b). 
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138 S 9. 
139 S 11. 
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4.2.3. Local endorsement in respect of ‘external’ ratings 
Registered rating agencies are permitted by the Act to endorse the credit rating of a 
person who is authorised to perform credit rating services that are similar to those 
regulated under the Act by the laws of a country outside of South Africa, but only 
provided that the laws in question establish an approved, equivalent regulatory 
framework and that they are supervised for compliance by a regulatory authority,144 
and subject also to certain other requirements.145 The effect of endorsement is that 
the credit rating is deemed to have been issued by the registered credit rating agency 
in question.146 Liability for endorsed credit ratings attaches to the registered credit 
rating agency in question and they cannot escape this on the basis that a particular 
rating was not their doing.147 The intention of this section is to permit credit rating 
agencies with South African operations to use credit rating services conducted by 
branches in other jurisdictions that are deemed by the registrar to be regulated by 
laws that are sufficiently equivalent to the laws of South Africa.148  
4.2.4. Liability of registered credit rating agencies 
As suggested above, there is some debate regarding whether or not civil liability for 
credit rating agencies is, in fact, a useful deterrent against negligent behaviour. The 
argument against it is that maintenance of reputational capital by profit-maximising 
ratings agencies should, in and of itself, provide enough of an incentive to ratings 
agencies to act in the best interests of capital market participants.149 The idea is that 
if credit ratings agencies provide inaccurate and unreliable ratings, they will forego 
profits. However, our legislature has taken a firm view, eschewing the market 
mechanism implied by reputational capital theory in favour of a policy decision to 
subject credit rating agencies to delictual liability under Section 19 of the Act: 
19. Liability of registered credit rating agency.—(1) A registered 
credit rating agency may be delictually liable, in respect of a credit 
                                                
144 S 1 definition of “external credit rating agency”. 
145 S 18. 
146 S 18(2). 
147 S 18(3). 
148 National Treasury response document to comments received on the Credit Ratings Services Bill as 
tabled in parliament on 5 March 2012 at 10 available to Sabinet subscribers at 
http://discover.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/policydocuments/policies12/DL061285_pt2.pdf accessed on 
13 August 2013. 
149 Ellis, Fairchild & D’Souza op cit note 7 at 211. 
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rating issued or credit rating services performed in the ordinary course 
of business in terms of this Act, for any loss, damages or costs 
sustained as a result of such credit rating or credit rating service.  
(2) Subsection (1) does not affect any additional or other 
liability of a registered credit rating agency to an investor or member 
of the public, arising from a contractual relationship or the application 
of any law. 
The latter parts of Section 19 contain provisions relating to the independence of 
credit rating agencies which prohibit any person from “hindering, interfering with, 
obstructing or improperly attempting to influence a credit rating’s content, 
methodology, model or assumptions”.150 It is not immediately clear what sanction or 
liability the Act envisages for a breach of this latter provision,151 but such an 
investigation is beyond the scope of this paper.  
5. Common law delictual liability of credit rating agencies to investors  
5.1. Introduction 
What does the liability provision in the Act entail for rating agencies in South 
Africa? Given that this legislation is completely novel, and also the dearth of any 
court decisions involving rating agencies, there is work to be done in establishing 
what this actually means for market participants and potential litigants.152 As is 
plainly evident in Section 19, the Act purports to employ the common law of delict 
to govern the liability regime of credit rating agencies.153 National Treasury’s view 
was that this is “the most practical approach” owing to the fact that the principles of 
common law delictual liability are “well established in our law”.154 The law of delict 
is concerned with ‘righting wrongs’, and in South Africa, a defendant commits a 
delict vis-à-vis a plaintiff if and only, by act or omission, the defendant infringes the 
plaintiff’s non-contractual right and the law justifies holding the defendant to a duty 
                                                
150 S 19(2). This includes the registrar. 
151 Indeed, s 32, which purports to deal with offences and penalties, makes no reference to 
transgressions of the s 19 independence provisions. 
152 Swanepoel op cit note 4. 
153 In this regard, Treasury seems to have followed the advices of counsel and academics almost to the 
letter. Cf National Treasury response document op cit note 148 at 4 and Locke op cit note 94 at 560. 
154 National Treasury response document op cit note 148 at 4. 
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to compensate the plaintiff. 155  In essence, this means that the law in certain 
circumstances deems that a loss should lie not where it falls,156 but should in fact lie, 
at least in part, with the person responsible for causing it.  
The liability envisaged by the Act that is relevant for present purposes is the 
case where a rating agency publishes negligent misstatements in its ratings and a 
third party investor relies on those misstatements to its detriment (that is, the value of 
the investment depreciates or, more likely, is lost outright). As suggested earlier, it 
has been argued that the role of the rating agency in contributing to an investor’s loss 
is similar to that of an auditor of a company who provides a clean audit report when 
it should have been qualified,157 because while the company contracts with the 
auditor for the provision of audit services, in reality many third parties, including 
investors, rely on the strength of the auditor’s opinion in dealing with the 
company.158 The same is said to be true of ratings agencies. The gist is that while 
issuers of debt securities certainly solicit credit ratings services themselves, investors 
also rely heavily on those credit ratings in reaching their investment decisions.  
Accordingly, in the event that an investor suffers a loss on the basis of 
reliance on negligently misstated credit ratings, can she sue the credit rating agency? 
Unlike auditors, there are no established guidelines for liability in the case of their 
negligent misstatement. Further, we also know that rating agencies owe investors no 
contractual duties because there is no privity of contract between them—any contract 
for the provision of rating services gives rise to rights and duties between the issuer 
and the rating agency only (that kind of a contractual relationship would be helpful 
in defining the ambit of any liability). So, the narrow question relevant for present 
purposes remains this: do credit rating agencies owe non-contractual duties to a 
wider class of persons than just the debt securities issuer to not make negligent 
misrepresentations in their ratings? 
                                                
155 Daniel Visser ‘Delict’ in Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles of South African Law 2007 9ed 1089 at 
1092. 
156 Harms JA notes in Telematrix (Pty) Ltd v Advertising Standards Authority SA (459/2004) [2005] 
ZASCA 73 at 12 that this idea is captured by the exception to the Afrikaans aphorism ‘die skade rus 
waar dit val’. 
157 Locke op cit note 87 at 54. 
158 Richard Jooste in Cassim op cit note 122 at 572; Locke op cit note 87 at 54. 
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5.2. The principles of delictual liability for pure economics loss caused by 
negligent misstatement in South African law 
The South African law of delict requires that four elements be present before a 
defendant can be assigned delictual liability in respect of a plaintiff’s loss caused by 
the defendant’s conduct. The universal requirement of the four elements means that 
South African law takes a “generalising” approach to delictual liability, 159  as 
opposed to the ordinary common law approach where liability is governed by a 
discrete set of established torts, each of which has unique requirements.160 As 
suggested above, for delictual liability to be imposed in South African law there 
must have been some blameworthy conduct on the part of the defendant (in our case, 
a negligent misstatement), which conduct caused harm to the plaintiff and which was 
also wrongful.161 In the section that follows, each of the elements constituting this 
delict will be examined in detail in so far as they relate to a claim by an investor 
against a credit rating agency for the purely economic loss he suffers in reliance on a 
negligently prepared credit rating.  
5.2.1. Conduct that causes harm 
The requirement of proving harm-causing conduct on the part of the defendant is 
likely to be one of the least contentious. All that needs to be proved is that the rating 
agency misrepresented the debtor’s risk of default,162 which representation will be in 
the form of a published ratings document attributable to the agency in question. 
Thereafter, the very fact of the commencement of litigation by a third party investor 
will in all likelihood indicate that the relevant rating was not accurate to the extent 
that the plaintiff is motivated to recover compensation for his losses.163 The investor 
would have had his interest in his investment set back sufficiently by the conduct of 
the defendant to prompt him to seek its recovery. This fact of the investor plaintiff’s 
                                                
159 J Neethling, J Potgieter & PJ Visser (translated by JC Knobel) Law of Delict 2006 5ed at 4. 
160 This is not to say that the common law has not had a pervasive and lasting impact on our hybrid 
system. English common law in particular has been extremely influential in the development of South 
African law, with references to their concept of a ‘duty of care’ appearing in Appellate Division 
judgments as early as 1910. See e.g. CG Van der Merwe, J Du Plessis, M de Waal, R Zimmerman & 
P Farlam in V Palmer (ed) Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: The Third Legal Family 2012 2ed at 175. 
161 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser op cit note 159 at 1. 
162 Locke op cit note 87 at 55. 
163 Locke op cit note 87 at 56. 
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loss necessarily entails satisfaction of the other aspect of the conduct element, that is, 
the conduct must have also been “harm-causing”.  
5.2.2. Negligence 
The standard of fault alleged by a plaintiff investor will almost invariably be 
negligence. It is highly unlikely that a ratings agency would intentionally award an 
inaccurate rating in respect of a debtor, but if it did, the plaintiff would bear the onus 
of demonstrating this. In any event, this paper’s analysis is restricted solely to 
negligence as the fault standard, which is submitted to be a much more likely 
situation. The test for negligence is very well established in South African law: 164  
“For the purposes of liability culpa [negligence] arises if— 
(a) a diligens paterfamilias165 in the position of the defendant— 
(i) would foresee the reasonable possibility of his conduct 
injuring another in his person or property and causing 
him patrimonial loss; and 
(ii) would take reasonable steps to guard against such 
occurrence; and 
(b) the defendant failed to take such steps.” 
The above test gives content to the true of criterion of negligence being “whether in 
the particular circumstances the conduct complained of falls short of the standard of 
the reasonable person”.166 Judicial decisions have given clarity with regards to the 
types of attributes the ‘reasonable person’ might have,167 thereby setting a kind of 
objective standard. The standard of reasonableness increases with special 
expertise,168 real or professed, but is never lowered.169 The requirement that a 
reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have taken precautionary 
steps must not be forgotten. Four factors are considered to this end: (i) the degree or 
                                                
164 Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A). 
165 A diligens paterfamilias is the so-called reasonable man, derived from the Latin for ‘head of a 
family’, the management of his household’s affairs being considered a model of prudence and 
caution. 
166 Scott JA in Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2000 (1) SA 
827 SCA 21. 
167 Visser op cit note 155 at 1126 fn 186. 
168 Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 A D 438 444 confirmed in Durr v Absa Bank Ltd and Another (424/96) 
[1997] ZASCA 44. 
169 Visser op cit note 155 at 1126 fn 189. 
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extent of the risk created by the actor’s conduct, (ii) the gravity of the possible 
consequences if the risk of harm materializes, (iii) the utility of the actor’s conduct, 
and (iv) the cost of eliminating the risk of harm.170 These factors inform a weighing 
of the magnitude of a risk against the cost and benefit of taking the precautions in 
question,171 and accordingly the facts of a case are always decisive.172  
The crisp question, then, in determining whether a credit rating agency was 
negligent in its rating activities is whether its conduct falls short of that of a 
reasonable credit rating agency. A judge will be required to make a determination in 
this regard based on evidence led in court. It must be borne in mind that in the 
absence of particularly glaring evidence, this will in all probability be a difficult 
exercise and require testimony from expert witnesses with specialist knowledge. 
Rating agencies pride themselves on the complexity of the models they employ and 
it will take considerable effort and skill on the part of the plaintiff to be able to prove 
that they were negligent in their work. In spite of this, motivated litigants and 
competent judging have done exactly this with obvious successes in the common law 
world already.173 
5.2.3. Wrongfulness 
Wrongfulness is a stand-alone and central element of delictual liability in South 
African law.174 Thus, it is not enough that negligent conduct by a defendant causes 
plaintiff harm, it must rather be the case that the conduct in question is also 
‘wrongful’. The presence of wrongfulness in a particular instance of loss-causing 
conduct is a question of judicial discretion, which discretion has on occasion 
“hardened” into rules that generate rebuttable presumptions about the presence or 
absence of wrongfulness in certain instances.175 For example, there is a presumption 
of wrongfulness where a person’s positive conduct causes physical injury to another, 
or where a person steals another’s property. In spite of the crystallisation of rules that 
generate presumptions about the existence of wrongfulness, judicial discretion is 
                                                
170 Ngubane v SA Transport Services 1991 (1) SA 756 (A) at 776H-I. 
171 Visser op cit note 155 at 1127. 
172 A suggested in Visser op cit note 155 at 1126, repeated fact patterns do however yield non-binding 
but persuasive rulings on what constitutes reasonable conduct in particular types of circumstances.  
173 See e.g. the Bathurst case supra note 5. 
174 Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A). 
175 Anton Fagan ‘Rethinking wrongfulness in the law of delict’ (2005) 122 The South African Law 
Journal 90 at 90. 
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sometimes used to give clarity to a vague distinction, to fill a gap in the rules or to 
allow an exception to them.176 Judicial discretion is used in the application of a 
‘general test’ for wrongfulness. This test that says that the wrongfulness of conduct 
that also causes harm is dependent on ‘the legal convictions of the community’ or 
‘considerations of policy’.177 It goes without saying that this is a rather empty 
definition.  
In giving more meaning to this concept adherents of the so-called “standard 
view” of wrongfulness say that wrongfulness on the general test is determined with 
reference to the ex post facto reasonableness of conduct, or ‘objective 
reasonableness’. 178  It is submitted, however, that the standard view has been 
convincingly demonstrated to be flawed.179 The argument against the standard view 
is that while in certain instances the presence of wrongfulness turns on the ex ante 
reasonableness of conduct, outside of those instances any references to 
reasonableness in the wrongfulness enquiry are in fact references to the whether it is 
reasonable to impose liability on the defendant towards the plaintiff for the harm that 
resulted from that unreasonable conduct.180 It has been argued that there is strong 
evidence to support this view, principally that the courts expressly endorse it and 
secondarily that the courts impliedly endorse it in two ways, firstly by the factors 
that they look at in making a determination on wrongfulness in certain cases and 
secondly by their assertion that the wrongfulness of certain types of conduct arises 
from the breach of a “duty to act without negligence”.181 One area where this is plain 
is in the province of “pure economic loss”, as in the case at hand. 
“Pure economic loss” cases present particular conceptual difficulties in 
establishing wrongfulness in South African law for reasons of principle. In Roman 
                                                
176 Fagan op cit note 175 at 90. 
177 Fagan op cit note 175 at 94, particularly the cases cited in fn 20. 
178 Fagan op cit note 175 at 92. 
179 FDJ Brand ‘The contribution of Louis Harms in the sphere of Aquilian liability for pure economic 
loss’ (2013) 76 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 57; RW Nugent ‘Yes, it is always 
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times, the Lex Aquilia protected only bodily integrity and real rights.182 Thus, if there 
was no physical damage to property or person interposing a loss to patrimony, there 
could be no claim for compensation. Later extensions of the Aquilian principles in 
Roman-Dutch Law also did not go far enough to give rise to a general remedy for 
wrongfully caused patrimonial loss,183 but the modern position is different. Today it 
is established law that a plaintiff may sue for compensation for pure economic loss 
in accordance with the ordinary principles of Aquilian liability, but the presence of 
wrongfulness is not presumed, as it is in the case of physical injury.184 Most 
importantly for present purposes, South African courts have held that a plaintiff can 
bring an action for loss of a purely economic nature that was occasioned by an 
alleged negligent misstatement on the part of a defendant. 185  However, the 
circumstances in which our courts find make a finding of wrongfulness in pure 
economic loss claims are heavily circumscribed and considerations of public and 
legal policy are always determinative.186 Having said that, in certain categories of 
claims it has become the practice of the courts to impose liability “as a matter of 
course”.187 For example it has been held that collecting banks owe a legal duty to 
lawful owners of cheques,188 and that road users whose negligence causes a toll road 
to be closed are liable to the toll operator that loses revenue as a consequence.189 
The courts in South Africa (and, indeed, abroad) always approach new 
categories of pure economic loss cases with circumspection on the basis of two 
universal arguments.190 Firstly there is the argument that allowing the imposition of 
such liability would be “socially calamitous” because society would be placed under 
an “almost intolerable burden on legitimate human activity”.191 Secondly there is the 
spectre of so-called ‘limitless liability’ (limitless in both magnitude and in respect of 
a multiplicity of plaintiffs) that arises because of the absence of the brake on liability 
normally provided by the fact of measureable physical damage suffered by a person 
                                                
182 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser op cit note 159 at 7-9. 
183 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser op cit note 159 at 9 fn 50. 
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or class of persons.192 These justifications, advanced by courts the world over, sit 
conveniently on top of our Roman and Roman-Dutch law traditions which both 
agree that economic loss on its own is not sufficient to justify the imposition of 
liability.193 Accordingly the default position in South African law is that claims for 
pure economic loss are not prima facie recoverable; it is instead up to the plaintiff to 
persuade the court that it ought to be so because of arguments that turn on 
wrongfulness. 194  That is, there must be policy considerations that dictate the 
defendant should be saddled with a duty to recompense the plaintiff.195 Subscribers 
to the ‘standard view’ have argued that this represents a departure from established 
precedent,196 but once again it is submitted that this suggestion has been persuasively 
rebutted.197  
The role of the wrongfulness element “a safety valve; a control measure; [or] 
a long stop” that is used to limit liability for pure economic loss cannot be 
underemphasised. 198 It is important to point out that what is required in a court’s 
policy analysis is not “an intuitive reaction to a collection of arbitrary factors but 
rather a balancing against one another of identifiable norms”.199 Often the charge is 
made that the introduction of policy factors as reference markers for judges can 
introduce uncertainty in the law.200 Indeed, as Brand JA noted in Fourway Haulage 
SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd,201 a “legal system in which the 
outcome of litigation cannot be predicted with some measure of certainty would fail 
in its purpose”.202 Given the importance that the courts attach to the ostensibly 
                                                
192  Hence the memorable and somewhat apocalyptic dictum from Cardozo J in Ultramares 
Corporation v George A Touche 74 ALR 1139 at 1145: “if liability for negligence exists… there is 
the danger of liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate 
class.”  
193 Justinian The Digest of Roman Law: Theft, Rapine, Damage and Insult (translated by CF Kolbert) 
at 9.2.27 and 9.2.21.  
194 Visser op cit note 139 at 1106.  
195 Telematrix supra note 156 at para 12. 
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197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid at 61. 
199 Telematrix supra note 156 at para 12. 
200 Brand op cit note 179 at 63. 
201 The Fourway case supra note 189. 
202 Brand JA refers in that judgment to Lord Scott of Foscote in Lagden v O'Conner [2003] UKHL 64 
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“One of the main functions of the law of obligations… is to provide… a set of yardsticks for 
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nebulous concept of ‘policy’, what, exactly, are the factors that the courts consider in 
practice?  It has been emphasised repeatedly203 that there is no closed list but in the 
context of negligent misrepresentations the courts have held that important 
considerations include: 
(a) The plaintiff’s vulnerability to the risk; 
(b) Whether the extension of liability would impose a burden on the 
defendant that is not warranted;  
(c) the nature and proximity of the parties’ relationship; 
(d) whether the statement was made in the course of a business context or in 
providing a professional service; 
(e) the professional standing of the maker of the statement; 
(f) the extent of the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant for information and 
advice; and 
(g) the reasonableness of the plaintiff relying on the accuracy of the 
statement. 204 
How might each of these factors apply in the context of a negligent 
misstatement by a rating agency? It is submitted that the following considerations 
would be in the forefront of the court’s mind when reasoning through the factors. 
First, the likely plaintiff’s vulnerability to the risk of an inaccurate credit rating 
would depend on their having the means of performing equivalent or approximating 
analyses internally, and thereby being able to reliably ‘check’ the work of the rating 
agency. Whilst it is certainly true that many large institutional investors do have such 
resources, this is not true of the entire market and almost certainly not true in the 
case of government investors. Second, it is not clear that the extension of civil 
liability would place an unwarranted burden on a rating agency. Recent 
developments in the regulation of their industry have already gone a significant way 
                                                                                                                                     
litigation. But the cost of litigation… provide impelling reasons why the yardsticks of… legal 
liability… should be kept as simple… as practicable." 
203 See inter alia the Telematrix case supra note 156; Delphisure Group Insurance Brokers Cape (Pty) 
Ltd v Kotzé and others [2011] 1 All SA 109 (SCA); The Cape Empowerment Trust case supra note 
187. 
204 The Delphisure case supra note 203 at para 25. 
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in ensuring that appropriate standards of due diligence are maintained,205 and it 
requires no stretch to see that breach of these standards of care is sanctioned by 
liability. Third, the nature and proximity of the parties’ relationship would be judged 
with reference to the extent to which the rating agency was aware of the class of 
persons who might constitute plaintiffs, and whether it expected them to rely on its 
statements. Rating agencies are without doubt well aware that investors take heed of 
their ratings, and that they might do so in coming to investment decisions. Fourth, 
rating agencies publish their ratings exclusively in business contexts and they do so 
while holding themselves out as professionals of high standing in their field. In other 
words, they claim special knowledge by dint of rigorous, professional expertise and 
engender a sense of confidence in the market that the information they provide is 
accurate.206 
If a plaintiff investor can make a case for the presence of wrongfulness on at 
least some of the listed grounds (which by no means constitutes a numerus clausus), 
she can be hopeful, at least, of persuading a court to agree. The very fact of plaintiffs 
being successful in novel instances in the past is evidence of the viability of such a 
strategy. 
5.2.4. Causation 
For the causation element of a delict to be satisfied, the tests for both factual and 
legal causation must be met.207 Factual causation implies that it must have been the 
case that the defendant’s negligent conduct is what actually caused the plaintiff to 
suffer the harm, colloquially described as the “but for” test as articulated in Minister 
of Police v Skosana208 and followed ever since.209 This test entails that the negligent 
conduct in question must have been a necessary condition in the outcome that 
eventuated. It has been suggested that the barriers to proving factual causation in the 
                                                
205 See Chapter 4 infra. 
206 As will be demonstrated, the last two factors are intertwined and present difficulties for plaintiffs. 
It is not immediately clear that it is reasonable for an investor to forego common sense or any due 
diligence on its own part in placing excessive reliance on a third party’s predictions, and it is also not 
clear to what extent investors actually base their decisions on ratings. 
207 International Shipping Company (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 (1) SA 680 (A). 
208 1977 (1) SA 31 (A) and confirmed in Siman & Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1984 (2) 
SA 888 (A). 
209 This is in spite of academic criticism. See e.g. Neethling, Potgieter & Visser op cite note 159 at 
279.  
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case of reliance on a negligent misrepresentation in a credit rating are quite low,210 
because third party investors will almost always rely on ratings provided by ratings 
agencies in making their investment decisions. But is this really as straightforward as 
it seems? Consider the following example that demonstrates the need for nuance in 
the application of the test for factual causation. B seeks investment advice from A, 
and A responds by giving two misstatements, X and Y, about a particular investment 
product. Imagine that B relies on both in making his (failed) investment, and further 
that X was a negligent misstatement on A’s part but Y was a non-negligent 
misstatement. Imagine finally that even if the advice had not contained X, B would 
still have made the investments, but that if it had not contained Y, B would not have 
made the investments. In this case, A is not delictually liable even though he acted 
negligently and he caused B’s loss. This is because the negligence itself did not 
cause the loss, and so A’s negligence was not a necessary condition for the harm. 
Remember, it was assumed that misstatement X was negligent but not necessary for 
B to make the bad investment; and that misstatement Y was necessary but was non-
negligent. Accordingly, in fewer words, for the factual causation test to be satisfied it 
must be the case that the actual negligent conduct in question was a necessary 
condition for the loss that eventuated. 
Legal causation, on the other hand, operates as a brake on liability in that 
certain consequences are deemed by our law to be so remote from the conduct that 
caused them that they are unforeseeable and accordingly defendants should not be 
liable for them. In this way its function is in some ways similar to the wrongfulness 
element. Legal causation extends only so far as courts see fit in any given fact set in 
accordance with this authoritative statement from Corbett CJ in Standard Chartered 
Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd:211  
“[The test for legal causation] is a flexible one in which factors such as 
reasonable foreseeability, directness, the absence or presence of a 
novus actus interveniens, legal policy, reasonability, fairness and 
justice all play their part.” 
                                                
210 Locke op cit note 87 at 56. 
211 1994 (4) SA 747 (A). 
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At least one author argues that legal causation will be a significant barrier to 
third party investors who actually rely on rating agencies.212 The idea is that such 
third parties are most often highly sophisticated, wealthy institutional investors who 
use a much more rigorous process in coming to their investment decisions than 
merely relying on ratings. On this line of reasoning it becomes very difficult to show 
that a rating agency’s opinion (however reputable it may be) factored significantly 
into the investor’s decision-making process. It is submitted that the very same factors 
that figure in the court’s reasoning in coming to a determination with regards to 
wrongfulness will figure at this stage, too. It is thus important to realise that mere 
foreseeability of loss is insufficient: foreseeability is but one factor that may in any 
event be defeated by policy reasons, and vice versa.  
It is interesting to note the suggestion from Treasury that in the case where an 
investor places excessive reliance on a credit rating, that may possibly constitute a 
novus actus interveniens if it amounts to “carelessness” that breaks the causal chain 
between the defendant’s conduct and the harm in question.213 This may well be the 
case where an investor completely forgoes even the most rudimentary investigation 
on his own part, and aspirant plaintiffs should bear that in mind. That being said, a 
plaintiff’s meeting the factual causation test in the classic rating agency case should 
not prove insurmountable, and provided wrongfulness can be proved it is likely that 
the test for legal causation can be met, too.  
6. Lessons from abroad: selected common law jurisdictions 
Common law jurisdictions assign negligence liability to defendants who breach an 
objective duty of care owed to plaintiffs. Just as in South Africa, in some instances 
this is straightforward (as in the case of physical injury) but in the case of pure 
economic loss the default position is the same and losses are not recoverable.214 The 
classic justification for this was summarised by Cardozo J in Ultramares 
Corporation v. Touche215 who said allowing such allowing such claims would result 
in “liability in an indeterminate amount, for an indeterminate time, to an 
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Erwin Deutsch translated by Tony Weir ‘Compensation for pure economic loss in German law’ in E 
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indeterminate class”. Despite this default position, all jurisdictions (be they common 
or civil law) permit recovery of pure economic loss in limited, exceptional 
circumstances. In common law jurisdictions there are accordingly established 
categories of exceptions that are expanded in increments by case law.  
Each of English, Australian and United States law are highly relevant 
comparisons for the South Africa context. First, English law is highly influential on 
the South African law of delict for historical reasons, with local courts classically 
following the lead of the House of Lords and citing their jurisprudence with approval 
particularly with regard to developing the element of wrongfulness viewed in light of 
the English ‘duty of care’ concept. Second, Australian courts are similarly observant 
of English legal developments, and since theirs is the only jurisdiction where a court 
has taken the leap of actually imposing a duty of care on a ratings agency, their 
experience is ripe for comparison. Third, the United States is relevant because of its 
highly litigious culture, and the real possibility of a very similar suit being decided in 
the very near future.216 It will therefore be most instructive to look first at Australia, 
which has defined the circumstances giving rise to ratings agency liability under the 
common law, and then infer how United States and English courts are likely to judge 
similar facts under their own laws. The central question remains universal: when will 
courts forsake the principal of caveat emptor in order to allow an investor an action 
for recovery? 
6.1. Australia 
As explained in the introduction to this dissertation, nowhere has rating agency 
liability been treated as severely as it has in Australia. One especially noteworthy 
judgment, Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty 
Ltd (No 5),217 is reverberating around the common law world and providing the 
impetus for litigators in other jurisdictions to pursue the claims of disappointed 
investors.218 (This case should be considered in the context of a separate but 
contemporaneous judgment, Wingcarribee, which made similar findings on related 
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facts regarding structured credit products, but with regards to a bank as defendant 
instead of a ratings agency.) 219 The judgments are both very long, 450 pages in 
Wingcarribee and 1459 pages in Bathurst, partly as a consequence of the complexity 
of the structured credit products in question but also partly because of the significant 
detail in which the judges dealt with the tangled issues of:  
i. the duty of care owed by a ratings agency,  
ii. the meaning to be attached to a credit rating when supplied by an 
entity that is not a credit rating agency, and  
iii. how to determine the existence of fiduciary and advisory duties in an 
investment advice relationship.  
Prior to this judgment there was a general reluctance for Australian courts to 
assign liability for what amounted to plaintiffs’ reliance on ‘investment advice’, the 
idea being that in the course of their work, financial advisors provide various 
recommendations and they should not be responsible for the way in which their 
advices are used. The same was thought to apply in respect of investor reliance on 
ratings provided by rating agencies. In the Bathurst case the Federal Court of 
Australia was faced with a claim by multiple Australian local councils who had lost 
money invested in complex, highly leveraged credit derivatives called ‘constant 
proportion debt obligations’ (CPDOs). The CPDOs took the form of notes issued by 
an SPV created expressly for that purpose by Dutch investment bank ABN Amro. 
The performance of the CPDOs depended firstly on the continuation over their ten-
year life of a technical phenomenon known as the ‘mean reversion’ of their credit 
curve spread. Second, they were structured in such a way that if they incurred losses 
over a sustained period because of prolonged departure from the credit curve 
spread’s mean, the CPDO holders would be required to engage in a “fight to the 
death” and “double down” by increasing investments when performance fell in order 
                                                
219 In Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in liq) [2012] FCA 1028 three 
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to meet the note’s coupon. This was because provided the CPDO was capitalised 
enough on the downside, the investor would eventually ‘win’ if he “waited it out”, 
subject to an automatic “cash-out” trigger if the net asset value fell by 90%.220 These 
are inherently very risky characteristics for debt securities, and at trial a witness in 
fact described this practice as “much like the doubling strategy on the roulette table 
of a casino,” where a gambler doubles up after a losing bet in the hope of “bet[ting] 
yourself out of the hole” to break even or make a return.221  
Nonetheless, in 2006 prominent rating agency Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
was engaged to provide a credit rating in respect of the CPDOs, which it did by 
using stochastic Monte Carlo simulations to quantitatively predict the CPDO’s 
likelihood of default, in addition to various other qualitative measures.222 It arrived at 
a AAA rating. When the bank later issued a second and a third tranche of CPDO 
notes of the same type, S&P purported to perform the same ratings exercise and 
these latter tranches also received an AAA rating. However, increased volatility in 
global credit markets and a fall in average spreads meant that by 2007 each of the 
tranches of the highly geared notes had suffered significant losses.223 By 2008 S&P 
had downgraded the latter two notes issues to BBB+ ratings, but the downward 
spiral continued. The death knell for the products eventually sounded when the 
automatic cash-out rule was triggered and the investors received back only 6.674% 
of their initial investments. The councils sought recovery of their massive losses 
from ABN Amro and its agent, but most importantly for present purposes from S&P 
who supplied the AAA rating.  
Given the complexity of the credit products involved, the court’s judgment is 
technically very thorough in its assessment of S&P’s actions. Jagot J takes particular 
issue with certain assumptions used by S&P in their ratings modelling, heavily 
criticising some for being excessively optimistic and others for being “arbitrary, 
irrational and unreasonable”.224 In her view, S&P’s modelling of the first and second 
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tranche could only reasonably anticipate an AAA rating in a very narrow set of 
circumstances that were, frankly, unrealistic. This resulted in the CPDOs receiving 
AAA ratings when with standards of reasonable competence they should not have.225 
This problem was compounded by the fact that when S&P was employed to rate the 
third tranche of the notes (which it knew was to be marketed in a private placement), 
it again assigned a AAA rating merely on the basis that the bank ‘had said’ that the 
notes were a “carbon copy” of the first tranche. However, in court they were unable 
to prove that any modelling had been carried out on these later issues whatsoever.226 
One internal email from S&P was particularly damning:  
“This is analytical bs at its worst. I know how those ratings came about and 
they had nothing to do with the model!”227  
Jagot J noted at the outset that the credit rating did not amount to “investment 
advice”, but was rather “a record of an opinion of Standard & Poor’s, which held 
itself out as having specialist expertise in assessing the creditworthiness of financial 
products and was intended to be understood as such”.228 Further, she noted that the 
role of the court in questioning the standards of care in preparation of the ratings was 
not to establish what a proper rating would have been, but merely whether the AAA 
rating was given with a reasonable basis.229 The judgment goes on to find that three 
key criteria used by S&P contributed to a rating that was not successful in accurately 
reflecting the risk associated with the CPDOs. These were the utilisation of a 
significant number of inputs which S&P should have known to be incorrect,230 
S&P’s failure to factor in exceptional but plausible inputs,231 and S&P’s failure to 
anticipate the sensitivity of the CPDOs to very slight changes to the model’s 
inputs.232 In addition, S&P’s conduct in accepting the bank’s own model amounted 
to a departure from the standards of reasonable care and skill demanded of a 
reasonable ratings agency. Therefore, S&P was liable for negligent misstatement 
because the AAA rating they had supplied was a statement that in S&P’s opinion—
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supposedly held on reasonable grounds and after taking requisite ‘reasonable’ care—
that the creditworthiness of the CPDO was very strong, when in fact it should have 
known that it was not.233 This is a novel finding that warrants close attention. It is 
significant because it entails that rating agencies owe a very extensive duty of care to 
a class of persons who, until now, they had been comfortable to largely ignore, 
specifically potential investors of special vulnerability who are unable to assess a 
debtor’s creditworthiness themselves or to challenge a rating agency’s opinions.  
But is the imposition of a duty of care on a rating agency as straightforward 
as this judgment suggests? It is worth keeping in mind that this judgment emanates 
from a court of first instance and will in all probability be appealed. Accordingly, 
what are the legal issues that an appeal court might investigate further? As suggest 
above, Australian courts have historically followed the lead of the English courts in 
pure economic loss cases and the factors taken into account in making a 
determination as to the existence of a duty to prevent it are very similar: the risk of 
indeterminate liability, the vulnerability to the loss, the existence of contractual 
relationships and the directness of relationship between the parties.234 It has been 
argued that three factors suggest that an appeal court will agree with the court a 
quo.235 First, as Jagot J points out, whereas the indeterminacy problem is one that is 
widely cited in tortious pure economic loss cases as militating against imposing 
liability, in this case the number of plaintiffs was very small as a consequence of the 
CPDO’s purchase rules and S&P’s fee incentive scheme which favoured larger, 
single debt issues over multiple smaller ones.236 Second, S&P was deemed to have 
control of the time period during which it owed any duties because it could withdraw 
its ratings at any time.237 Third, over and above the judge’s stated reasons, it has 
been argued that the English requirement that the imposition of the duty be ‘fair, just 
and reasonable’238 is more than satisfied because such a duty works to ensure that the 
opinions of those who purport to provide independent creditworthiness opinions 
                                                
233 The Bathurst case supra note 5 at 1153.  
234 The Bathurst case supra note 5 at section 12.5.1. 
235 Edwards op cit note 222. 
236 The Bathurst case supra note 5 at 2745. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 36. 
48 
 
actually do so independently and competently when it is known that the ratings will 
be used in marketing a particular debt security to investors.239 
In spite of these compelling arguments in favour of imposing liability, it 
should be borne in mind that the English courts (and many other common law 
jurisdictions) are inherently loath to find a duty care exists in novel scenarios, 
especially when the plaintiff is well placed to guard against the harm in dispute and 
decides not to.240 The Bathurst court, however, found that the complete reliance by 
the investors on S&P’s rating was reasonable because the particular investors 
involved did not have the resources or the capacity to “second guess” the rating, but 
Jagot J did suggest that the position might be different if the investors were 
sophisticated financial institutions with the means to second guess their opinions.241  
At least one author has suggested that this reasoning is naïve,242 the argument 
being that it is in the nature of ratings of complex credit products that they are 
prospective likelihood-of-default assessments that rely on base case assumptions that 
are disclosed and available for inspection by investors. On this view, responsibility 
for reliance on flawed ratings should rather lie with investors themselves, because 
they should surely, at the very least, be scrutinising the assumptions employed. Thus, 
in deciding to buy (or recommend to a client) a particular structured credit product 
on the strength of its rating, they take responsibility for holding a particular view 
about the rating agency’s assumptions and they must live with that decision. Second, 
it is not clear that mere unsophistication on the part of the investor should absolve it 
for bearing any responsibility for losses on its investments. Given the complexity of 
the financial products at play and the lack of financial expertise on the part of the 
investors (a fact admitted in Bathurst), should they not have taken steps to engage 
expert financial advice which would have enabled them to come to informed, 
reasonable investment decisions? It is not clear that the judge distinguished properly 
the appropriateness of the plaintiffs placing complete reliance on the credit ratings 
(without applying their own scrutiny), from an implied guarantee by S&P in favour 
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of investors, which was certainly neither assumed by, nor in the mind of, any of the 
parties at any stage prior to the decision to seek recovery.243 
Finally, it is important to note the court’s reluctance to give effect to S&P’s 
disclaimers purporting to exclude liability for reliance on their opinions. These were 
wide and ostensibly comprehensive: 
“The rating is not investment, financial, or other advice and you 
should not and cannot rely upon the rating as such.”244 
“Accordingly, any user of the information contained herein should not 
rely on any credit rating or other opinion contained herein in making 
any investment decision.”245 
“Information has been obtained by Standard & Poor’s from sources 
believed to be reliable. However, because of the possibility of human 
or mechanical error by our sources, Standard & Poor’s, or others, 
Standard & Poor’s does not guarantee the accuracy, adequacy or 
completeness of any information and is not responsible for any errors 
or omissions or the result obtained from use of such information.”246 
All of these attempts at disclaiming liability were rejected by Jagot J, firstly 
on the basis of their being displayed with insufficient prominence in the relevant 
communications given their significance,247 and secondly as a matter of principle, 
because in her view to allow the disclaimers to stand would have the effect of 
rendering the very opinion which S&P were being paid to provide “meaningless”.248 
This is arguably defeasible on the basis that investor reliance on a particular rating 
without further scrutiny (by himself or an expert engaged on his behalf) is not, in 
fact, reasonable,249 and to assume that it is, expressly against the advices of a 
disclaimer, is surely untenable.  
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It should also be noted that in holding that ratings agencies owe a duty of 
care to investors, the Bathurst court was at pains to point out that the circumstances 
before it were unique.250 The solicitation of S&P by the bank to rate the CPDOs 
made it obvious to any reasonable person that the rating given was to be eventually 
used in the marketing of the CPDOs, and the court pointed out that the outcome 
might very well be different in the case of an unsolicited rating provided in respect 
of a public company. It is submitted that this largely accords with our sense of the 
uneasy, fraught relationship of mutual interest that arises in a “issuer-pays” model, 
where both the bank and the rating agency are incentivised to ensure that a product 
in question receives the highest rating possible.251 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
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6.2. England 
In English law, three tests are traditionally used to decide whether a defendant owes 
a plaintiff a duty of care in a claim for pure economic loss in tort: (i) the ‘assumption 
of responsibility’ test, (ii) the ‘threefold’ test (was the plaintiff’s loss a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions, was the relationship between the 
parties one of sufficient proximity, and, in in the circumstances, is it fair, just and 
reasonable to impose a duty of care on the defendant?), and (iii) the ‘incremental’ 
test. 252 Contrary to what one might expect, mere foreseeability by the defendant of 
the plaintiff’s loss is insufficient to give rise to a duty of care in English law; more is 
required. That ‘more’ originates in the same factors as those examined in the 
Bathurst case.253 Given the relative conservatism of the English bench versus the 
Australia courts, it has been argued that the English courts would likely come to the 
opposite conclusion about the existence of a duty of care on the Bathurst facts.254 
That may well be, however a separate set of international obligations have founded a 
new action for plaintiff investors in England that will arguably have exactly the same 
effect.  
The United Kingdom is a member of the European Union (EU) and 
accordingly it is bound to comply with legislation published in the EU’s Official 
Journal. On 31 May 2013 Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 (“CRA 3”) came into force. 
As the third iteration of the EU’s response to the role purportedly played by ratings 
agencies in the financial crisis, CRA 3 requires that member states must ensure that 
the ratings agencies operating in their territories publish ratings that are founded on 
“a thorough analysis of all the information that is available” according to the 
methodologies they profess to employ.255 A failure to meet this standard gives rise to 
potential liability under Article 35a: 
“Where a credit rating agency has committed, intentionally or with 
gross negligence, any of the infringements listed in Annex III having 
an impact on a credit rating, an investor or issuer may claim damages 
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from that credit rating agency for damage caused to them due to that 
infringement.”256 
 Although CRA 3 takes the form of an EU Regulation (with which member 
state compliance is mandatory) as opposed to a Directive (which requires only that a 
member state achieve a particular result—its means of doing so are discretionary), 
states are afforded a degree of latitude in order to determine the content of their civil 
liability regimes.257 The UK, for its part, has therefore adopted the Credit Rating 
Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulations 2013,258 breach whereof can give rise to civil 
liability (even in spite of a failure to make a determination with regards to a duty of 
care) on the grounds of a “failure to adopt, implement or enforce adequate measures 
that ensure ratings are based on a thorough analysis of all information” or a “failure 
to comply with an agency’s published methodologies”.259 Accordingly, based on 
these standards, it requires no stretch to see that liability would be the likely outcome 
if the Bathurst facts were decided under these rules because it was admitted that the 
ratings given by S&P in Bathurst departed from their model.260  
There is an extra requirement, however, that an investor who brings such an 
action must be able to demonstrate that it relied reasonably and “in accordance with 
Article 5a(1) or otherwise with due care” on the rating in question in reaching its 
investment decision.261 The effect of this proviso seems to be a pre-emptive defence 
against frivolous suits brought by disgruntled investors, who are required to show 
that they conducted their own credit risk assessment under Article 5a(1) or exercised 
the same degree of care that a reasonably prudent investor would have used in the 
circumstances.262 It has been argued that where the investor has not exercised due 
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care but the ratings agency defendant has in fact also been negligent, the principles 
of contributory negligence will reduce any damages award.263  
6.3. The United States 
Credit rating agency liability in the United States is unique in that ratings agencies 
have traditionally enjoyed constitutional protection under the First Amendment.264 
The effect of this is that US courts have treated ratings agencies as if they are 
journalists who provide editorial ‘opinions’ under the banner of free speech, subject 
to the proviso that liability will be imposed in instances of “actual malice” where an 
opinion is published with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard to its 
truth, a notoriously high hurdle for litigants.265 US courts’ readiness to accept the 
First Amendment defence appears to be on the wane,266 however. In Abu Dhabi 
Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Company, Incorporated, 267  the court 
rejected the First Amendment defence on three main grounds: (i) the narrowness of 
the distribution of the rating in question, (ii) the rating agency’s state of mind and 
knowledge, and (iii) evident conflicts of interest.268 Based on this recent decision, it 
therefore appears that US courts will not uphold a First Amendment defence where 
the distribution audience is limited, where the rating agency knows that its ratings 
are misleading, and where there are conflicts of interest (for example, in the common 
case where the rating agency plays a role in the structuring of the actual product it is 
then paid to rate).269 Furthermore, up until the passage of Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act,270 ratings agencies were generally exempt 
from liability under Section 11 of the United States Securities Act of 1933.271 
Notwithstanding the success or failure of any pre-emptive defences, rating agency 
liability for pure economic loss in tort law will ordinarily be founded on several 
bases. 272  These include negligent misrepresentation, product liability, tortious 
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interference and arguably breach of a professional care standard,273 each of which 
will be considered briefly in turn. 
It has been argued that in a claim for negligent misrepresentation courts will 
apply very similar standards to the ones applied against auditors in similar claims, 
despite the differences between the two types of defendant.274 It is submitted that the 
most important of these is Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which 
gives rise to liability to investors where their reliance on a ratings agency’s reports is 
foreseeable.275 Given that this is almost always the case (ratings agencies certainly 
know their ratings are used and relied upon), this is a compelling ground for liability.  
Second, it may also be argued that product liability should be extended to 
intangible consumer credit products, including credit ratings.276 This is arguably 
more of a stretch, however, because an investor would need to prove that ratings (as 
distinct from the debt securities they rate) amount to intangible products themselves, 
that they were defective at the time of their issue, that investors were foreseeable 
users of those products and that investors were harmed by those products. This 
burden remains thus far unproven in US courts and it remains open to attack on the 
grounds that ratings are opinions, not products, and that at the time of their issue they 
cannot be defective because they are necessarily predictive and not reactive. One can 
imagine that the ratings agencies might argue, “no one predicted the financial crisis!” 
Nonetheless, this remains an interesting, novel ground for tortious liability.  
Third, tortious interference with contracts is also a possible ground for 
liability if it can be shown that an unsolicited negative rating prevents a debt issuer 
from accessing capital and thereby interferes with prospective contracts. However, in 
Jefferson County School District v. Moody’s Investor Services, Incorporated277 the 
court was not persuaded by similar arguments, even in the case of a CRA defendant.  
Fourth, is there a ratings agency standard of professional care in US law? 
One case in particular, Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.278 
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leaves open the possibility that there might be. The facts were very similar to 
Bathurst but the claimants founded their action on breaches of US Securities Laws in 
the first instance and only on negligence in the alternative. Accordingly there was 
never a need for the court to lay down the standard of care expected of credit rating 
agencies because the case was resolved under the Securities Laws. Notwithstanding 
this failure to define the standard of care owed by a ratings agency to investors on 
highly appropriate facts, it remains possible that a US court might do so in the future, 
particularly in light of the general shift in legislators’ attitudes. This shift is 
evidenced by the drive to increased regulation and accountability of financial 
intermediaries under laws like Dodd-Frank.  
One case that is currently working its way through the courts, and 
representative of many others like it, is California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System v Moody’s (CALPERS).279 Developments in this case are being watched very 
closely the legal fraternity who are hoping it will provide much needed clarity with 
regards to exactly what is required for a ratings agency to incur liability for negligent 
misrepresentation.280 The plaintiffs in CALPERS have successfully overcome the 
initial hurdle of the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of First Amendment 
protection. The claimants had invested $1.3 billion worth of government employee 
pension funds in AAA-rated structured finance assets that collapsed as the global 
financial dislocation took hold in 2007 and 2008. They accordingly sued Moody’s 
for negligent misrepresentation and “negligent interference with prospective 
economic advantage”,281 arguing three major points: (i) that Moody’s rating models 
were flawed because they did not factor in problems with liquidation of the 
underlying assets, (ii) the models did not account for the high geographical 
concentration of the assets, and (iii) the data that was used as inputs was data that 
Moody’s other faulty models had provided.282 It has been argued compellingly that 
the facts of this case will meet the threshold implied by the three Abu Dhabi factors 
mentioned above, and that when this decision is handed down it will establish that 
rating agencies face common law liability for lapses in the lead in to the global 
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financial crisis.283 This will, in all likelihood, lead to massive claims in the US, 
especially given the friendliness of that legal system to class actions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Civil liability and caveat emptor: a death knell? 
It is not controversial to say that credit ratings are pervasive in modern capital 
markets, and further that they play a significant part in the evaluation of financial 
institutions’ balance sheets with regards to regulatory capital requirements.284 It is 
also clear that financial markets had become overly reliant on credit ratings in the 
run up to the financial crisis.285 One of the unintended consequences of a civil 
liability regime for credit ratings agencies is that investors are incentivised to be less 
thorough in their own assessments of credit risk, quite possibly to the extent that they 
might take decisions in reliance on ratings that they would ordinarily not have.286 
“After all,” opportunistic investors might say, “even if we’re wrong, S&P gave that 
debt security a rating of AAA, so if our investment fails we can just sue them!” With 
this kind of problem in mind, it has been a key objective of both governments and 
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financial supervisory bodies (for example the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS)) in the aftermath of the financial crisis to reduce the reliance 
placed by financial market participants on credit ratings.287 The core idea is that 
ratings should, at the most, support ordinary investor due diligence, but never replace 
it.288   
How should governments give effect to this idea? The overtures from the EU 
in the form of CRA 3 are both progressive and particularly illuminating in this 
regard. Over and above the Article 35a civil liability regime discussed above,289 
CRA 3 also attempts to moderate two types of investor behaviour: (i) investors 
outsourcing their credit assessment responsibilities, and (ii) a mechanistic, 
unthinking application of investment fund parameters. The first behaviour described 
in (i) is problematic because it can contribute to investors placing exclusive reliance 
on credit ratings to the exclusion of their own judgement, thereby purporting to 
divest themselves of any duty to conduct the required due diligence. The EU’s 
response to this kind of behaviour is Article 5a that requires that potential investors 
“shall make their own assessment and shall not solely or mechanistically rely on 
credit ratings for assessing the creditworthiness of an entity or a financial 
instrument”.290 This is an important barrier against frivolous lawsuits that a lenient 
approach to Article 35a might otherwise encourage.291 
The second behaviour which the Regulations are alive to is the so-called 
“cliff effect”, where a kind of herd mentality on the part of investors can force a 
collective sell decision in respect of a particular debt security. This can occur when 
the mechanical application of investment criteria means that a ratings downgrade 
causes a debt security to no longer be eligible to form part of an investment fund.292 
This phenomenon is problematic because it can exaggerate the impact of a 
downgrade if a high number of securities owners are automatically compelled to sell 
a particular security without the application of any discretion. Again, the core 
                                                
287 Ibid. 
288 See e.g. the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Strengthening the Resilience of the 
Banking Sector’ (2009) Consultative Document available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.htm 
accessed 24 May 2012. 
289 See 6.2 infra. 
290 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 (as amended), Art 5a. 
291 See 6.2 infra. 
292 Edwards op cite note 39 at 186. 
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problem is a failure on the part of investors to apply their minds to a particular 
investment decision, but because the outcomes are potentially different, the response 
to this problem is different, too. In this regard, Article 5c gestures towards a 
proposed regulatory framework for institutional funds that explicitly removes any 
references to credit ratings in EC legislation which might trigger exclusive, 
unthinking reliance on credit ratings.293 However, the stipulated timeframe by when 
this legislation must be passed is 2020, so there is a period of limbo yet.294 The 
question of what might eventually replace credit ratings remains unanswered. It has 
been argued that it will likely be unacceptable for financial institutions to attempt to 
perform all credit assessments in-house, and that any substitutes for credit ratings 
will inherently suffer the same defects that befall credit ratings themselves.295 
Whatever the outcome, the European authorities have yet to treat any of the possible 
replacement suggestions with any seriousness.296  
Locally, it is not yet clear what the South African legislature’s move will be 
in this regard. Given that the delictual regime envisaged by the Act arguably sets a 
higher bar than what is contemplated under CRA 3’s Article 35a, it is debateable 
whether or not the behaviours described above will ever be problematic in the South 
African context. This is because a local plaintiff would arguably need to do more 
work in proving the wrongfulness element of a delict (which requires demonstrating 
the reasonableness of reliance), thus perhaps problems of opportunistic litigation are 
less relevant.  
8. Conclusion 
The global financial crisis animated very vividly the extent to which the fortunes of 
countries and their people are intertwined with a financial system that is notorious 
for its opacity. This is especially true when we consider the extent to which global 
economic growth has been slowed (and indeed, in many cases reversed) in recent 
                                                
293 See, for example, the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) 
Directive 2009/65/EC and the European Securities and Markets Authority “Guidelines on a common 
definition of European money market funds” 19 May 2010, available at 
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times as a direct consequence of the financial crisis. In this dissertation I have 
attempted to clarify how properly functioning credit rating agencies might contribute 
to the efficient operation of capital markets. It should be clear that if ratings agencies 
observe uncompromisingly high standards of care at all times, they can be a highly 
beneficial addition to the welfare and efficiency of a capital market. But if they do 
not observe those standards of care, the modern technologies that permit the 
interconnectedness of capital markets mean that the dire consequences of negligently 
misrating a debt security are not confined to geographical borders. In response to 
these kinds of problems, many countries are taking the step of moving towards a 
civil liability regime for ratings agencies as a deterrent against reckless behaviour. It 
is submitted that with regard to this narrower question of the application of a civil 
liability standard, four tentative conclusions are uncontroversial. 
First, it is highly debatable whether the spectre of extensive civil liability will 
compel ratings agencies to meet requisite standards of care in performing their 
gatekeeping function, or whether it will simply drive up costs for all market 
participants and contribute to a decrease in competition in the ratings industry, which 
is already characterised by highly entrenched oligopolies. It is also debatable 
whether there is any wisdom in designing a system of liability that can be said to 
remove the incentives that should motivate investors to conduct their own credit risk 
evaluations and due diligence in accordance with the fundamental principle of caveat 
emptor.297 That being said, this is the path that our legislature has started down. 
Prospective litigants will be required to grapple with in the principles of delict 
examined in this dissertation in weighing the merits of their cases. 
Second, the common law jurisdictions of Australia, the UK and the US each 
permit actions against ratings agencies for negligence in the composition of their 
ratings, but each country does so via subtly divergent means. Accordingly, the 
conclusion that governments everywhere are seeking to use civil liability as a 
deterrent against shoddy professional practices is inescapable. I have attempted to 
show in this dissertation that one can make a case that the novel findings of the 
Federal Court of Australia in Bathurst can be replicated with some success in a court 
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in South Africa, provided the right facts persuade a judge on the crucial element of 
wrongfulness. Furthermore, given our legal system’s tangled history, lessons from 
the common law jurisdictions of England and the United States will almost certainly 
guide our own courts in reaching their decision when this issue is litigated. This is 
most obviously true with regards to wrongfulness in light of persuasive authorities 
that deal with the analogous ‘duty of care’ concept. Disappointed investors who are 
on the hunt for a defendant would be wise to become familiar with the application of 
these factors before embarking on the costly road of court action that carries with it 
the possibility of an adverse finding of contributory negligence. 
Third, in light of the fact that the suggested basis for liability in England in 
fact emanates from Europe, and that as described in this paper the G-20 members 
have nearly all recently enacted similar legislation, the days of soaring profits for 
credit rating agencies—which sometimes come at the expense of accuracy and 
independence—are arguably numbered. Whether this is a good thing for capital 
market efficiency or credit rating agency integrity (or both) remains to be seen. Some 
academics have suggested that in the event that civil liability proves to be an over-
deterrent that results in a ‘market freeze’, whereby the agencies are excessively 
hesitant to provide any ratings at all, a kind of ‘cap’ on liability should be introduced 
so as to give some comfort to the rating agencies who might be faced with suits for 
pure economic loss.298 But given that the suggestions for capped liability almost 
always emanate from civil law jurisdictions it is debateable whether our legislature 
would follow suit and thereby be seen to trespass in the realm of delictual damages 
normally which is presided over by judges.  
Finally, and related to the preceding point, when the first of these cases 
reaches a judge in South Africa, the wrongfulness element of delictual liability for 
this ‘new’ type of pure economic loss should, as always, be approached with 
abundant caution. Our courts are fortunate to have a large body of pure economic 
loss jurisprudence to draw from. Because of this, provided ample attention is given 
to how the wrongfulness factors in analogous cases might be transposed onto the 
case of a credit rating agency, the first case will be absolutely critical in establishing 
what kinds of behaviours and circumstances might attract liability and what will not.  
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All governments are trying to determine how best to insulate themselves 
against the effects of a future financial crisis and most have taken steps to regulate 
the ratings agency industry. In the context of South Africa, the Credit Ratings 
Service Act is our legislature’s first foray into the murky waters of regulating ratings 
agencies. It is quite likely, however, that in the event that the first court decisions in 
terms of Section 19 of the Act are perceived to be investor friendly to the extent that 
they trigger frivolous and opportunistic litigation, that it will not be the last.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8  
(Translation: “My God – his latest judgement!” 
“Even worse – that’s a Moody’s thumb!”) 
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